Mearsheimer’s own stance on Russia seems to contradict his theory. His theory of “offensive realism” would seemingly predict that Russia will be aggressive towards Eastern Europe as soon as it returns to military strength. This suggests that Eastern Europe would have a strong incentive to join NATO as a deterrence.
A defensive alliance of small powers against a potentially hostile bigger power seems logical within the framework of the “offensive realism” theory. Particularly given Russian history in the region.
I agree with you that Mearsheimer appears to be more concerned with disagreeing with Liberal Idealism than being consistent.
Yes, actually a majority of realists took a broadly pro-Western stance. Mearsheimer’s position lies at the extreme end among realists, placing disproportionate blame on the West for Russia’s aggression.
Following on your conversation with Michael, I believe one more thing should've been added to beef up your, otherwise, solid analysis. As JM argues, offensive Realism predicates that powers would seek to increase their power when given the opportunity.
Thus, only by this account, the eastward NATO enlargement can't be "a fault", an error, since the West would look for any opportunity to enhance its relative power. In line with the offensive Realist recipe, it's in fact natural move 😊 to be undertaken while Russia is weak. So, nothing “to blame” the West for here, according to offensive Realism.
Thanks for this. I broadly like Mearsheimer, but he certainly has, in my view, a strange blind spot when it comes to Russia. He very publicly declared in either 2021 or 2022 that Putin would categorically not invade Ukraine, and now when he's called on that, he claims that his position was correct at the time, because there was no evidence to the contrary. If Putin's well-known 2021 essay wherein he proclaims Ukraine to be an historically Russian region is brought up, he dismisses that as not evidence. It's just difficult to take anything Meirsheimer has to say about that conflict seriously because of this history of retrospectively moving the goalposts every time he's proven wrong about something.
This is very helpful. He's clearly wrong. Somehow though we need the insight that certain regional power-stripping actions or perceived threats towards nations that have sufficient power (e.g., past 'Superpowers' and former imperial powers) can cause them to respond with belligerence.
For diplomacy purposes, if trying to avoid later clashes or military build-ups different geopolitical moves would be done with an eye to the perceived interests of various nation-states, or at least an attempt to anticipate what their perceived interests will be.
Of course, a nation with a lot of power like the USA hasn't been far-sighted in its power grabs. But this is a very general problem.
Very interesting. I have some sympathy for the Mearsheimer view having listened to a lot of Leftist narratives. That said, my own take on the Russian invasion has nothing to do with the threat from NATO but rather the poor way in which the collapse of the Soviet Union was stewarded by the West. All this is very easy to say with hindsight & arguably the West had no responsibility for the state formation that followed the period of disintegration. Also the Yeltsin takeover was supported by Clinton at a time when we hadn’t had the chance to see the pernicious effects of neoliberalism. The biggest problem presented by the Washington Consensus / neoliberal ideology is that institutions that offer a buffer between market forces & society are stripped away & privatised. The ideology assumes the emergence of self-regulating systems, but we now know it leads to imbalances & runaway wealth effects. In the West, we countered this (increasingly ineffectively) with welfare. In developing countries there was nothing. This leaves a vacuum for tyrants & authoritarians. It was, I think inevitable that without very careful, long-term stewardship, Russia would fall into chaos followed by strong man leadership. The long term investment & effort employed in rebuilding Japan & Germany after WW2 was absent in Russia (& Iraq / Afghanistan …). We can say “tough luck” but Russia is not Vietnam. It was never going to accept a subsidiary role serving the global economy.
He talks about the difficulty of protest movements catalysing coherence from their fragmented structure. So they live in a perpetual state of chaos - flaring up & burning out. Authoritarians / narcissists (power & status actors) by contrast, impose order & can catalyse extreme action - but then tend to disintegrate when the energy needed to maintain order becomes overwhelming. Democracies are more of a seesaw - an Edge of Chaos phenomenon that constantly renegotiates the balance between order & fragmentation, mostly by responding to social feedback loops. It’s by no means perfect. Occasionally the system moves so far from equilibrium that we see over-correction (Brexit, Trump). But importantly, democracy contains the seeds for renewal whereas autocracy must fragment or tighten. At the geopolitical level, the mistake we made, I think, was to stop renewing the social contract between states. As you describe, we thought that democracy would be an emergent property from collapse. But bad things run into voids too. We have been poor at stewarding our own democratic market systems let alone helping disintegrating states to renew themselves. I still hope for an Elinor Ostrom / Keynesian renewal of international rules. Light but coherent with automatic stabilisers & enough adaptability to absorb the complexity of this world. But it’s not looking good …
Thank you for this thoughtful comment. I agree that the West underestimated the difficulty of Russia’s transition and placed too much faith in the power of commerce alone to foster democracy. I would add that Russia’s large natural resource wealth (the "resource curse") made it easier for a narrow elite to consolidate power without needing broad political support. The pre-existence of hierarchical structures inherited from the soviet era made it harder for democracy (as highlighted by Acemoglu and Robinson in Why Nations Fail). Furthermore, without the external constraint of a prospective EU accession (because Russia was too large for that), the path to authoritarian consolidation was sadly likely.
Yes, the idea that "all (geo)politics is local" explains the Ukraine war far more accurately than Mearsheimer’s notion of states as unitary actors. Internal Kremlin dynamics played a much bigger role in the decision to go to war than anything the West did—just as Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith’s models would suggest.
That said, I believe there’s an even more important dimension. Samuel Huntington’s framework of competing civilizations offers a deeper understanding of the conflict’s roots. Ukraine is a textbook example of a fault line country—where Western and Orthodox civilizations collide. Huntington actually predicted a war like this in The Clash of Civilizations back in 2000, citing Ukraine on page 39 as a likely flashpoint for future conflicts.
(For context: I have firsthand experience with the cultural divides in this region.)
This articulates well criticisms that I have had in my head for a while, half formed, of Mearsheimer's position. In addition to your great points, even if we fully accept his argument that NATO has been "aggressive" by expanding into Eastern Europe, what right does Mearsheimer have to criticize them for it? That's a perfectly understandable thing for the West to do within his framework. If the world is international anarchy, and states act out of fear, then shouldn't he approve of the more powerful state / coalition (the West) using its power to secure a larger sphere of influence?
I see other commenters have made similar points. It's somewhat inexplicable to me why Mearsheimer seems unaware of the holes in his position.
I don't want to have a sphere of influence in backward third world countries. It's not in my interest to do so, you get sucked into their garbage problems and there is little upside to show for it.
There's much bigger problem than the fact of internal policy disputes with the "realist" idea of states as unitary actors. In the modern world, the assumption that citizens support their own state against others has ceased to be true. Most politically active people share some version of the Marxist view that "the workers have no country". Trumpists here support the Trump regime against Albanese Labor, while US Democrats are (rightly) eager to see Trump fail.
Mearsheimer is a quack. I went to high school with his daughter, who might be legitimately one of the dumbest people I have ever met. He turned her into one of the pro-Palestinian demonstrators because he has absolutely no spine and value system.
Excellent, nuanced and well argued! Thanks for writing this.
One counter point I often hear from those in favor of Mearsheimer's view is that, in a mott and bailey type move, while it's true that NATO didn't expand in the way that empires expand by invading or acquiring territory, the West is still to blame because we "allowed" eastern European countries in and didn't close the door to Ukrainian or Georgian membership in the future.
You adress this as well, but they also then make the "realist" point that regardless of what's morally right or wrong, it was foolish of the west not to be considerate enough of Russias geopolitical sphere of interest. That Russias has always been attacked from the plains that connect western and Eastern Europe running through Poland and Ukraine, and that it was almost to be expected for them to do what they did. In essence, it's your fault if go in and poke the bear.
And ultimately, they claim that there's no evidence that Russia has any ambitions on more territory besides having Ukraine as a neutral buffer zone, and that, if the West just let them do their thing and didn't support Ukraine, the whole thing would have been over and Russia/Putin would be satisfied. World Peace.
Extending your points on the topic of leadership: a common mistake is to assume that national leaders have the national interest in mind. For example, journalists reporting on Trump tend to look for strategies in the US interest when it should be obvious that Trump has no regard for the interests of US citizens at all. Mearsheimer’s view on the NATO ‘threat’ implicitly imagines Putin as a defender of the Russian people, when it should be obvious that he has no regard for the welfare of any of them.
Once you allow for the possibility of leaders who will disregard the interests of their own citizens, a lot more becomes clear.
Taiwan is a good example. The US engagement with/protection of Taiwan since 1949 has been consistent with the interests of US and Taiwanese citizens, and many more besides. The scenario where Xi launches an invasion would be detrimental to almost everyone, including Chinese citizens.
So… why would Xi be contemplating an invasion? Those who imagine he is working for the interests of China are left to make up stories about the supposed US threat to China. But the truth is simpler and darker: Xi will happily inflict misery on the world, including his own citizens, if he thinks he can secure his status as one of the heroes of Chinese history.
I found your article interesting and I am not qualified to respond at length. However, I cannot agree that Mearsheimer is wrong about NATO expansion being at least a contributory cause for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Liberal West, including the UK especially, developed a belief that if they treated Putin like they would another Liberal, that he would have some kind of epiphany and behave like a Liberal. They were wrong. Putin is a Realist and has always, and will always behave like one. Your argument that Putin and his cronies have personal motives beyond any that might benefit the State of Russia is absolutely right, but he and they are the ones in charge. Peace, not just for a few month or years but a long-standing peace in the region will only be secured when those negotiating with Putin recognise their shortcomings as a collective of nations with national interests that trump (pun intended) their relationships with their liberal international neighbours. As Liberal democracies, unlike Putin, they have their respective electorates to answer to.
Thank Stephen for your thoughtful comment. I agree with you that Western countries were overly optimistic about how engaging with Russia would change its behaviour, and that they underestimated the nature of Putin’s regime. However, I would respectfully disagree on the weight given to NATO expansion as a cause of the invasion. In reality, Ukraine’s membership in NATO was not credibly on the cards at the time. The process was stalled and key members like Germany and France were opposed. Moreover, the war we have seen is not a defensive reaction to a real security threat, but an openly imperialist attempt to annex territory that Russia claims as inherently its own. Blaming the West for provoking Russia in this context is, I would argue, a little like blaming the police for provoking the mafia by offering protection to its victims. While Western misjudgements exist, the ultimate driver of the war lies in Russia’s imperial ambitions, not in NATO policy.
In terms of balance, I would be interested in your thoughts on John Pilger's 2014 Guardian article, linked at the bottom of my comment.
The years of civil war in Ukraine seem oft forgotten. Useful to review the archived press releases from the OSCE monitoring mission dating back to April 2014 (also linked) for primary source material that I think shows both sides were going at it hammer and tong, and there was valid basis for these regions feeling anti-russian speaking discrimination (Donesk, Luhansk etc.)
The $5bn of US funding to Ukraine up to 2013 (not insignificant in gdp% terms) that Nuland discussed visits from McCain, Tech Camp Kyiv etc. There are some good Ukr. parliamentary speeches on these translated to English from around the 2013 period that raise concerns regarding U.S influence, which I think would be useful to consider.
Allso important to recognize Ukraine lost 10 million voters (and more 'registered to vote') between 2004 and 2014-2019, over a third of the electorate, which is fairly unprecedented from a western perspective.
The idea of a united Ukraine invaded by Russia is a bit of a trope.
I think there is some substantial evidence to suggest that it concern at losing a former allied state and anti-russian discrimination was fairly important. The citing of the Monroe doctrine and "what would America do if it was Mexico?" still has not been convincingly rebuffed.
As I write in my piece, democracies are not good by nature, so the USA and other democracies can do and have done things that are in contradiction with the lofty principles they profess. But John Pilger's political stance on this issue is too influenced by an anti-Western imperialism view that paints the West, the US, and NATO systematically as the bad actors. It reduces Ukraine to being a pawn without agency, and it exaggerates the antagonistic intents and long-term plans of the USA to undermine Russia. It is very Manichean and does not help to understand the world. In addition, this focus on anti-Americanism leads to whitewashing worse autocratic regimes that oppress their population and wage wars of conquest. It is too easy to fall for the coalitional psychology impetus to feel that the enemy of my enemy might be my friend.
I have written quite a bit on Ukraine on Twitter; here is a thread with useful counterarguments to the Russian narratives of a spontaneous separatist war in Eastern Ukraine, on the prevalence of the far-right in Ukraine, and so on.
Appreciate the response and re-reading my post, cringe at my typos. Written before going to bed on a cellphone!! Will look your twitter up. Thanks again.
You claim that Mearsheimer’s blaming the West is a fundamental error in his analysis of the Ukraine conflict and yet he has just been proven to be correct by no less than the Gray Lady itself who has acknowledged that this conflict is a proxy war started by the West.
For those of us who have known this to be the case from the beginning the NYT’s predictable face saving “epiphany” is irrelevant other than as a useful cudgel to expose and undercut the bullshit of the neocons who initiated this latest debacle.
As for your erudition on the larger issues of what drives nations to war it holds little meaning nor provides any solace to those who are dying in the moment.
> You claim that Mearsheimer’s blaming the West is a fundamental error in his analysis of the Ukraine conflict and yet he has just been proven to be correct by no less than the Gray Lady itself who has acknowledged that this conflict is a proxy war started by the West.
All you have is an appeal to the dubious credibility of the NYT, and you don't even have that. Instead you had to link to an even more anti-American rag to explain what the NYT "really meant".
😂😂😂😂 stupid is as stupid does. Attacking the vehicle instead of the facts shows how insipid your viewpoint is. The NYT has been a supporter of the neocon proxy war from the start and has lied for years about the origins of the war and what was happening on the ground. This mea culpa is reminiscent of their fessing up to there being no WMD in Iraq. Another lie they helped propagate in support of the neocons. Unlike dullards such as yourself multitudes connected the dots and assembled the facts from the start to understand the truth of the war in Ukraine. Go peddle your idiocy elsewhere you are out of your depth here.
Thank you for your comment, Feral. I would just note that distrust of Russia in Eastern Europe has deep historical roots, shaped by centuries of imperial domination and more recent experiences under Soviet control. It is not something that needed to be "encouraged" by the United States. While American government agencies and NGOs have supported democratic development in the region, their focus has been on promoting rule of law, civil society, and independent media—not fostering hostility toward Russia. Criticism of Russian policies, especially following actions like the annexation of Crimea, is not the same as promoting "Russophobia."
To give one example, "deep historical roots" is subjective at best, forgotten or revived as convenient. To give one example, Russia was a traditional Polish folk enemy, but during WWI, Czech and Ukrainians in the Austro-Hungarian Empire were viewed as Russian, and Ukrainians in particular were believed to be Russian sympathizers (and punished accordingly).
You obviously don't know many people from Crimea. Even before 2014, Crimea was a hardship duty for Ukrainian conscripts, because the locals treated them as occupiers.
I actually know two Crimeans who voted to remain with Ukraine. They were viewed about the way Jews viewed nazi collaborators.
Russia is responsible for their poor reputation in Europe. look at the brutal history of the Russians/Soviets in all of Europe. These nations begged to be in NATO and they need no encouragement to hate and fear Russia.
This reply doesn't make any sense. In the first year of World War II, Russia invaded Finland, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. In 1956 it invaded and put down a popular movement in Hungary. In 1968 it invaded Czechoslovakia to stop the Prague Spring. Russia attacked Chechnya twice in the 1990s, invaded Georgia in 2008, and as discussed invaded Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. Most of the Eastern European nations who joined NATO had already been attacked by Russia. What does this have to do with arguments made by Nazis?
And yes, these actions are properly attributable to Russia, as the central element of the Soviet Union.
"Russia" did no such thing. The Soviet Union, an entity which no longer exists, did.
As concerns Georgia in 2008, the OSCE, hardly a friend of Russia, disagrees, concluding that Georgia began that war. As to why Russia would start a war mostly fought in Abkha,ia and South Ossetia, and then demand no territorial settlement or regime change after beating Georgia is best left as an exercise for neocons.
Meanwhile, explain why the world is not demanding protection from the United States and its lavishly documented track record of wars, invasions and coups.
Yes, I read Mearsheimer’s book and I even have a summary of it on my online library of book summaries.
https://techratchet.com/2021/04/16/book-summary-the-tragedy-of-great-power-politics-by-john-mearsheimer/
Mearsheimer’s own stance on Russia seems to contradict his theory. His theory of “offensive realism” would seemingly predict that Russia will be aggressive towards Eastern Europe as soon as it returns to military strength. This suggests that Eastern Europe would have a strong incentive to join NATO as a deterrence.
A defensive alliance of small powers against a potentially hostile bigger power seems logical within the framework of the “offensive realism” theory. Particularly given Russian history in the region.
I agree with you that Mearsheimer appears to be more concerned with disagreeing with Liberal Idealism than being consistent.
Yes, actually a majority of realists took a broadly pro-Western stance. Mearsheimer’s position lies at the extreme end among realists, placing disproportionate blame on the West for Russia’s aggression.
Following on your conversation with Michael, I believe one more thing should've been added to beef up your, otherwise, solid analysis. As JM argues, offensive Realism predicates that powers would seek to increase their power when given the opportunity.
Thus, only by this account, the eastward NATO enlargement can't be "a fault", an error, since the West would look for any opportunity to enhance its relative power. In line with the offensive Realist recipe, it's in fact natural move 😊 to be undertaken while Russia is weak. So, nothing “to blame” the West for here, according to offensive Realism.
Thanks for an excellent post Lionel.
Thanks for this. I broadly like Mearsheimer, but he certainly has, in my view, a strange blind spot when it comes to Russia. He very publicly declared in either 2021 or 2022 that Putin would categorically not invade Ukraine, and now when he's called on that, he claims that his position was correct at the time, because there was no evidence to the contrary. If Putin's well-known 2021 essay wherein he proclaims Ukraine to be an historically Russian region is brought up, he dismisses that as not evidence. It's just difficult to take anything Meirsheimer has to say about that conflict seriously because of this history of retrospectively moving the goalposts every time he's proven wrong about something.
This is very helpful. He's clearly wrong. Somehow though we need the insight that certain regional power-stripping actions or perceived threats towards nations that have sufficient power (e.g., past 'Superpowers' and former imperial powers) can cause them to respond with belligerence.
For diplomacy purposes, if trying to avoid later clashes or military build-ups different geopolitical moves would be done with an eye to the perceived interests of various nation-states, or at least an attempt to anticipate what their perceived interests will be.
Of course, a nation with a lot of power like the USA hasn't been far-sighted in its power grabs. But this is a very general problem.
It doesn't explain Russia's actions very well.
Amazing article. I think this is my favorite substack.
Thanks Vincent, that’s very kind to say. I’m glad you’re enjoying the posts!
Very interesting. I have some sympathy for the Mearsheimer view having listened to a lot of Leftist narratives. That said, my own take on the Russian invasion has nothing to do with the threat from NATO but rather the poor way in which the collapse of the Soviet Union was stewarded by the West. All this is very easy to say with hindsight & arguably the West had no responsibility for the state formation that followed the period of disintegration. Also the Yeltsin takeover was supported by Clinton at a time when we hadn’t had the chance to see the pernicious effects of neoliberalism. The biggest problem presented by the Washington Consensus / neoliberal ideology is that institutions that offer a buffer between market forces & society are stripped away & privatised. The ideology assumes the emergence of self-regulating systems, but we now know it leads to imbalances & runaway wealth effects. In the West, we countered this (increasingly ineffectively) with welfare. In developing countries there was nothing. This leaves a vacuum for tyrants & authoritarians. It was, I think inevitable that without very careful, long-term stewardship, Russia would fall into chaos followed by strong man leadership. The long term investment & effort employed in rebuilding Japan & Germany after WW2 was absent in Russia (& Iraq / Afghanistan …). We can say “tough luck” but Russia is not Vietnam. It was never going to accept a subsidiary role serving the global economy.
Separately, I was reading about Vincent Bevins most recent book this morning, which is a different perspective that supports your overall theme in this discussion: https://www.amazon.co.uk/If-We-Burn-Revolution-journalism/dp/1035412276
He talks about the difficulty of protest movements catalysing coherence from their fragmented structure. So they live in a perpetual state of chaos - flaring up & burning out. Authoritarians / narcissists (power & status actors) by contrast, impose order & can catalyse extreme action - but then tend to disintegrate when the energy needed to maintain order becomes overwhelming. Democracies are more of a seesaw - an Edge of Chaos phenomenon that constantly renegotiates the balance between order & fragmentation, mostly by responding to social feedback loops. It’s by no means perfect. Occasionally the system moves so far from equilibrium that we see over-correction (Brexit, Trump). But importantly, democracy contains the seeds for renewal whereas autocracy must fragment or tighten. At the geopolitical level, the mistake we made, I think, was to stop renewing the social contract between states. As you describe, we thought that democracy would be an emergent property from collapse. But bad things run into voids too. We have been poor at stewarding our own democratic market systems let alone helping disintegrating states to renew themselves. I still hope for an Elinor Ostrom / Keynesian renewal of international rules. Light but coherent with automatic stabilisers & enough adaptability to absorb the complexity of this world. But it’s not looking good …
Thank you for this thoughtful comment. I agree that the West underestimated the difficulty of Russia’s transition and placed too much faith in the power of commerce alone to foster democracy. I would add that Russia’s large natural resource wealth (the "resource curse") made it easier for a narrow elite to consolidate power without needing broad political support. The pre-existence of hierarchical structures inherited from the soviet era made it harder for democracy (as highlighted by Acemoglu and Robinson in Why Nations Fail). Furthermore, without the external constraint of a prospective EU accession (because Russia was too large for that), the path to authoritarian consolidation was sadly likely.
thank you Lionel, a fascinating read. I'm wondering how you see the views of Dr Bandy Lee fitting in here (or not)? She has been a vocal critic of the psychological contagion surrounding Trump: https://bandyxlee.substack.com/p/the-urgent-need-for-a-life-affirming-da3
Thanks! I do not know her views, I'll check them out.
Yes, the idea that "all (geo)politics is local" explains the Ukraine war far more accurately than Mearsheimer’s notion of states as unitary actors. Internal Kremlin dynamics played a much bigger role in the decision to go to war than anything the West did—just as Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith’s models would suggest.
That said, I believe there’s an even more important dimension. Samuel Huntington’s framework of competing civilizations offers a deeper understanding of the conflict’s roots. Ukraine is a textbook example of a fault line country—where Western and Orthodox civilizations collide. Huntington actually predicted a war like this in The Clash of Civilizations back in 2000, citing Ukraine on page 39 as a likely flashpoint for future conflicts.
(For context: I have firsthand experience with the cultural divides in this region.)
This articulates well criticisms that I have had in my head for a while, half formed, of Mearsheimer's position. In addition to your great points, even if we fully accept his argument that NATO has been "aggressive" by expanding into Eastern Europe, what right does Mearsheimer have to criticize them for it? That's a perfectly understandable thing for the West to do within his framework. If the world is international anarchy, and states act out of fear, then shouldn't he approve of the more powerful state / coalition (the West) using its power to secure a larger sphere of influence?
I see other commenters have made similar points. It's somewhat inexplicable to me why Mearsheimer seems unaware of the holes in his position.
I don't want to have a sphere of influence in backward third world countries. It's not in my interest to do so, you get sucked into their garbage problems and there is little upside to show for it.
There's much bigger problem than the fact of internal policy disputes with the "realist" idea of states as unitary actors. In the modern world, the assumption that citizens support their own state against others has ceased to be true. Most politically active people share some version of the Marxist view that "the workers have no country". Trumpists here support the Trump regime against Albanese Labor, while US Democrats are (rightly) eager to see Trump fail.
Mearsheimer is a quack. I went to high school with his daughter, who might be legitimately one of the dumbest people I have ever met. He turned her into one of the pro-Palestinian demonstrators because he has absolutely no spine and value system.
Excellent, nuanced and well argued! Thanks for writing this.
One counter point I often hear from those in favor of Mearsheimer's view is that, in a mott and bailey type move, while it's true that NATO didn't expand in the way that empires expand by invading or acquiring territory, the West is still to blame because we "allowed" eastern European countries in and didn't close the door to Ukrainian or Georgian membership in the future.
You adress this as well, but they also then make the "realist" point that regardless of what's morally right or wrong, it was foolish of the west not to be considerate enough of Russias geopolitical sphere of interest. That Russias has always been attacked from the plains that connect western and Eastern Europe running through Poland and Ukraine, and that it was almost to be expected for them to do what they did. In essence, it's your fault if go in and poke the bear.
And ultimately, they claim that there's no evidence that Russia has any ambitions on more territory besides having Ukraine as a neutral buffer zone, and that, if the West just let them do their thing and didn't support Ukraine, the whole thing would have been over and Russia/Putin would be satisfied. World Peace.
Any additional thoughts on these points?
Great article.
Extending your points on the topic of leadership: a common mistake is to assume that national leaders have the national interest in mind. For example, journalists reporting on Trump tend to look for strategies in the US interest when it should be obvious that Trump has no regard for the interests of US citizens at all. Mearsheimer’s view on the NATO ‘threat’ implicitly imagines Putin as a defender of the Russian people, when it should be obvious that he has no regard for the welfare of any of them.
Once you allow for the possibility of leaders who will disregard the interests of their own citizens, a lot more becomes clear.
Taiwan is a good example. The US engagement with/protection of Taiwan since 1949 has been consistent with the interests of US and Taiwanese citizens, and many more besides. The scenario where Xi launches an invasion would be detrimental to almost everyone, including Chinese citizens.
So… why would Xi be contemplating an invasion? Those who imagine he is working for the interests of China are left to make up stories about the supposed US threat to China. But the truth is simpler and darker: Xi will happily inflict misery on the world, including his own citizens, if he thinks he can secure his status as one of the heroes of Chinese history.
I found your article interesting and I am not qualified to respond at length. However, I cannot agree that Mearsheimer is wrong about NATO expansion being at least a contributory cause for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The Liberal West, including the UK especially, developed a belief that if they treated Putin like they would another Liberal, that he would have some kind of epiphany and behave like a Liberal. They were wrong. Putin is a Realist and has always, and will always behave like one. Your argument that Putin and his cronies have personal motives beyond any that might benefit the State of Russia is absolutely right, but he and they are the ones in charge. Peace, not just for a few month or years but a long-standing peace in the region will only be secured when those negotiating with Putin recognise their shortcomings as a collective of nations with national interests that trump (pun intended) their relationships with their liberal international neighbours. As Liberal democracies, unlike Putin, they have their respective electorates to answer to.
Thank Stephen for your thoughtful comment. I agree with you that Western countries were overly optimistic about how engaging with Russia would change its behaviour, and that they underestimated the nature of Putin’s regime. However, I would respectfully disagree on the weight given to NATO expansion as a cause of the invasion. In reality, Ukraine’s membership in NATO was not credibly on the cards at the time. The process was stalled and key members like Germany and France were opposed. Moreover, the war we have seen is not a defensive reaction to a real security threat, but an openly imperialist attempt to annex territory that Russia claims as inherently its own. Blaming the West for provoking Russia in this context is, I would argue, a little like blaming the police for provoking the mafia by offering protection to its victims. While Western misjudgements exist, the ultimate driver of the war lies in Russia’s imperial ambitions, not in NATO policy.
Hi Lionel, thought provoking article.
In terms of balance, I would be interested in your thoughts on John Pilger's 2014 Guardian article, linked at the bottom of my comment.
The years of civil war in Ukraine seem oft forgotten. Useful to review the archived press releases from the OSCE monitoring mission dating back to April 2014 (also linked) for primary source material that I think shows both sides were going at it hammer and tong, and there was valid basis for these regions feeling anti-russian speaking discrimination (Donesk, Luhansk etc.)
The $5bn of US funding to Ukraine up to 2013 (not insignificant in gdp% terms) that Nuland discussed visits from McCain, Tech Camp Kyiv etc. There are some good Ukr. parliamentary speeches on these translated to English from around the 2013 period that raise concerns regarding U.S influence, which I think would be useful to consider.
Allso important to recognize Ukraine lost 10 million voters (and more 'registered to vote') between 2004 and 2014-2019, over a third of the electorate, which is fairly unprecedented from a western perspective.
The idea of a united Ukraine invaded by Russia is a bit of a trope.
I think there is some substantial evidence to suggest that it concern at losing a former allied state and anti-russian discrimination was fairly important. The citing of the Monroe doctrine and "what would America do if it was Mexico?" still has not been convincingly rebuffed.
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/13/ukraine-us-war-russia-john-pilger
https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2013/dec/218804.htm
https://www.osce.org/press-releases?page=286&filters=%20im_taxonomy_vid_1%3A%28896%29&solrsort=score%20desc&rows=10
As I write in my piece, democracies are not good by nature, so the USA and other democracies can do and have done things that are in contradiction with the lofty principles they profess. But John Pilger's political stance on this issue is too influenced by an anti-Western imperialism view that paints the West, the US, and NATO systematically as the bad actors. It reduces Ukraine to being a pawn without agency, and it exaggerates the antagonistic intents and long-term plans of the USA to undermine Russia. It is very Manichean and does not help to understand the world. In addition, this focus on anti-Americanism leads to whitewashing worse autocratic regimes that oppress their population and wage wars of conquest. It is too easy to fall for the coalitional psychology impetus to feel that the enemy of my enemy might be my friend.
I have written quite a bit on Ukraine on Twitter; here is a thread with useful counterarguments to the Russian narratives of a spontaneous separatist war in Eastern Ukraine, on the prevalence of the far-right in Ukraine, and so on.
https://x.com/page_eco/status/1573997809963274240
Appreciate the response and re-reading my post, cringe at my typos. Written before going to bed on a cellphone!! Will look your twitter up. Thanks again.
You claim that Mearsheimer’s blaming the West is a fundamental error in his analysis of the Ukraine conflict and yet he has just been proven to be correct by no less than the Gray Lady itself who has acknowledged that this conflict is a proxy war started by the West.
For those of us who have known this to be the case from the beginning the NYT’s predictable face saving “epiphany” is irrelevant other than as a useful cudgel to expose and undercut the bullshit of the neocons who initiated this latest debacle.
As for your erudition on the larger issues of what drives nations to war it holds little meaning nor provides any solace to those who are dying in the moment.
https://www.counterpunch.org/2025/04/04/new-york-times-throws-ukraine-under-the-bus-admits-us-proxy-war/
Now your projecting - 🙄😂🫏🤡
> You claim that Mearsheimer’s blaming the West is a fundamental error in his analysis of the Ukraine conflict and yet he has just been proven to be correct by no less than the Gray Lady itself who has acknowledged that this conflict is a proxy war started by the West.
Are you retarded or just a Putin shill?
No, but apparently you are!
Facts are stubborn things.
> Facts are stubborn things.
Too bad you don't have any.
All you have is an appeal to the dubious credibility of the NYT, and you don't even have that. Instead you had to link to an even more anti-American rag to explain what the NYT "really meant".
😂😂😂😂 stupid is as stupid does. Attacking the vehicle instead of the facts shows how insipid your viewpoint is. The NYT has been a supporter of the neocon proxy war from the start and has lied for years about the origins of the war and what was happening on the ground. This mea culpa is reminiscent of their fessing up to there being no WMD in Iraq. Another lie they helped propagate in support of the neocons. Unlike dullards such as yourself multitudes connected the dots and assembled the facts from the start to understand the truth of the war in Ukraine. Go peddle your idiocy elsewhere you are out of your depth here.
> Attacking the vehicle instead of the facts shows how insipid your viewpoint is.
What facts? The vehicle is all you have.
So the truth is you can’t read or you can’t comprehend the written word. Sad.
As if the United States were not encouraging russophobia in Poland and elsewhere.
Thank you for your comment, Feral. I would just note that distrust of Russia in Eastern Europe has deep historical roots, shaped by centuries of imperial domination and more recent experiences under Soviet control. It is not something that needed to be "encouraged" by the United States. While American government agencies and NGOs have supported democratic development in the region, their focus has been on promoting rule of law, civil society, and independent media—not fostering hostility toward Russia. Criticism of Russian policies, especially following actions like the annexation of Crimea, is not the same as promoting "Russophobia."
To give one example, "deep historical roots" is subjective at best, forgotten or revived as convenient. To give one example, Russia was a traditional Polish folk enemy, but during WWI, Czech and Ukrainians in the Austro-Hungarian Empire were viewed as Russian, and Ukrainians in particular were believed to be Russian sympathizers (and punished accordingly).
You obviously don't know many people from Crimea. Even before 2014, Crimea was a hardship duty for Ukrainian conscripts, because the locals treated them as occupiers.
I actually know two Crimeans who voted to remain with Ukraine. They were viewed about the way Jews viewed nazi collaborators.
Russia is responsible for their poor reputation in Europe. look at the brutal history of the Russians/Soviets in all of Europe. These nations begged to be in NATO and they need no encouragement to hate and fear Russia.
Funny, you recapitulate a favorite argument of the nazis.
Everyone who has had dealings with Russia has subscribed to that argument because it is the Truth. It's not Russophobia if it's true.
That was the second half of the nazi argument.
You are not very good at this are you? Maybe go back to your bubble.
This reply doesn't make any sense. In the first year of World War II, Russia invaded Finland, Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. In 1956 it invaded and put down a popular movement in Hungary. In 1968 it invaded Czechoslovakia to stop the Prague Spring. Russia attacked Chechnya twice in the 1990s, invaded Georgia in 2008, and as discussed invaded Ukraine in 2014 and 2022. Most of the Eastern European nations who joined NATO had already been attacked by Russia. What does this have to do with arguments made by Nazis?
And yes, these actions are properly attributable to Russia, as the central element of the Soviet Union.
"Russia" did no such thing. The Soviet Union, an entity which no longer exists, did.
As concerns Georgia in 2008, the OSCE, hardly a friend of Russia, disagrees, concluding that Georgia began that war. As to why Russia would start a war mostly fought in Abkha,ia and South Ossetia, and then demand no territorial settlement or regime change after beating Georgia is best left as an exercise for neocons.
Meanwhile, explain why the world is not demanding protection from the United States and its lavishly documented track record of wars, invasions and coups.