Great post, Lionel, and thanks for referencing my work. I largely agree with you here. In the Alliance Theory paper, we write that, "allies must support one another in conflicts—for instance, by defending their allies’ reputations, attacking their rivals’ reputations, and mobilizing support from third parties." Naturally, reputational attacks and defenses will be more effective if they are (or appear to be) factually correct. Likewise, third parties will be more effectively mobilized by (the appearance of) truth and consistency than by blatant deception and hypocrisy. We write in our response to commentaries that partisans often "try as hard as they can to rationalize [their inconsistent beliefs]--that is, to make them seem perfectly reasonable and not at all odd. They might even succeed." We also write that "Political discourse is a competition to satisfy people’s moral intuitions, to rally them to our side, and to draw them away from the other side. We must all recognize and feel these moral intuitions; otherwise, we could not use them to rally supporters."
So the propagandistic biases we discuss are constrained by (the appearance of) reality and morality. The constraints are pretty loose, as reality and morality can be mimicked by sophistry and moralism--mimicry that political zealots will be eager to accept and promulgate. Third parties might even have some motivation to accept the mimicry--they might possess a certain level of ideological gullibility--insofar as this gullibility helps them join up with powerful alliances. Even those within the coalition may benefit from the propagandistic narrative if it enhances commitment and support for the group. The cost of any deception may be outweighed by increased success in collective action and intergroup competition.
You pose the question: "If it were common knowledge that [ideologies] are just fig leaves on naked interests, why would people pay attention to them?" The answer is, of course, that they wouldn't. This implies that if ideologies *were* just fig leaves on naked interests, partisans would have a *very strong political incentive* to hide that fact and prevent it from becoming common knowledge. They would construct elaborate excuses and rationalizations designed to make their naked interests seem high-minded, beneficent, and truthful. They would shun and condemn anyone who rejected such excuses and rationalizations, because they would be a threat to their coalition. If they failed in preventing the ugly truth from becoming common knowledge, their coalition would lose power. A lot of political discourse is about calling out the other side's ugly truths and covering up our own side's ugly truths.
So if ideologies *were* just fig leaves on naked interests, they would almost certainly lack the *appearance* of being fig leaves on naked interests. While I think ideologies serve several functions beyond covering up ugly truths about naked interests, I think covering up such ugly truths *is* one of their functions, along with bolstering commitment to the group, signaling group loyalty, competing for ingroup status, and winning over third parties.
If there is any disagreement here (and I'm not sure there is), it may relate to moral asymmetries between political coalitions. It seems like you're suggesting that each side has different moral principles they're fighting to implement? If so, I disagree. I think partisans share the same basic moral psychology: our shared moral intuitions are the "high ground" that we compete to capture. As we write in the paper: "Rather than disagreeing about justice in the abstract, partisans may merely disagree about who deserves status (and how much), who deserves condemnation (and how much), and who deserves sympathy (and how much). Indeed, much of political discourse plays out against a backdrop of tacit moral agreement. Disputants compete to frame their opponents as immoral—e.g., unfair, selfish, disrespectful—while relying on shared assumptions of what counts as moral."
Plus, I don't think partisans know much, or care much, about how practically effective their policies are in upholding their apparent moral principles. What they mainly care about is their group gaining power, status, and resources in competition with rival groups, and themselves gaining power, status, and resources in competition with their fellow group members. It's a cynical view, I know, but I think it's essentially correct. For instance, there is some polling data indicating that most partisans would refuse to switch parties even if scientific evidence proved that their party's policies failed to promote the common good: https://thepulseofthenation.com/#the-common-good
Of course, this cynical view is something that both sides will have an incentive to cover up and deny, in favor of their more uplifting and group-mobilizing narrative. And they will busily search for theories of ideology that vindicate the moral superiority of their side--or at least, theories that try to soften the reputational damage that the truth might inflict. That some theories of ideology are more emotionally threatening than others is, in my view, one of the many empirical facts that any good theory of ideology should be able to explain. I think Alliance Theory (along with my work on social paradoxes) can explain it. https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/avh9t_v1
Thanks a lot for your extended answer, David! There’s no disagreement along the line you suggested. I agree with you that the primitive we should start with is the difference in interests, not differences in principles. Those interests lead coalitions to advocate for different principles, principles that justify outcomes favourable to them. Your paper rightly pushes for a clear-eyed, realist view of ideology, moving away from the idealised accounts we're often taught to believe.
The arbitrariness and instrumental nature of ideological bundles raises a real question: why do people take these debates seriously if it’s all just strategic? My view is that ideological debate plays a genuine role in negotiating the social contract, that is, in shaping general rules to allocate rights, duties, and entitlements in society. These rules need to appear justified and broadly acceptable, and consistency matters because it enables the rules to be applied in practice. Just like in any negotiation, actors may use deception, selective framing, or emotional appeals to gain advantage, but this doesn’t mean they are merely mimicking political engagement. Strategic behaviour doesn’t preclude genuine disagreement or serious deliberation; it simply means that the outcome is shaped by the balance of power and interests, not by disinterested reasoning alone.
On your point about shared moral psychology, I agree that most political actors appeal to broadly shared moral intuitions, fairness, loyalty, harm, etc. But competing coalitions support different principles for allocating status, sympathy, and condemnation, because they have different preferences over the distribution of these goods. In other words, the choice of who deserves what is determined by general principles regulating social interaction, and those principles reflect coalitional interests. So while the underlying moral building blocks may be shared, the principles constructed from them are contested, and ideologies help package those principles in politically useful ways.
This perspective is inspired by Ken Binmore’s Game Theory and the Social Contract, which I’ll discuss in later posts.
I would point out that to label your own view cynical is a somewhat amusing undermining of the real strength and value of your own argument
It's not cynical to accept your position. It is IMHO realistic. If this entails revealing a dark side to human behavior, which it does, then so be it. Recognizing the fact of a dark side is not cynical. If it is well evidenced (which IMHO it is) then to accept this fact it's not cynical. It is realistic.
As for Lionel, whose work I much enjoy, we have exchanged a few comments and he too has a residual faith in a view which you might characterize as less cynical.
For myself, I believe both of you have done terrific work in advancing material in the reality of group behavior. I embrace the dark side that has come to view. But because I am happy about it. But rather because that's the reality.
I agree with much of this analysis, but I think that it neglects deeper causes of ideologies. I believe that ideologies are not so much justifications of ad hoc political coalitions (as you argue) as rationalizations of non-rational psychological perceptions of the world.
Voters choose between ideologies based on their underlying psychological temperament (i.e. they use the non-rational part of their brain).
That temperament is largely determined by genetics, but parenting, culture, and life experiences also play a role. This explains why 30-60% of the variance in ideological views can explained by by genes.
For those who are interested, I go into more detail here:
The Substack is called "Optimally Irrational", following the book of the same name, so my starting point is that there are good reasons behind our behaviour that the "irrationality" literature from behavioural economics often overlooks. Our cognition is the result of an evolutionary process, and evolution sanctions good/bad decisions (https://www.optimallyirrational.com/p/why-we-should-look-for-the-good-reasons).).
As a matter of methodological principle, I find it problematic to start from cognitive features as fundamental explanations. I wrote in a previous post:
"In 1973, biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky wrote: ‘Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.’ This statement is obviously true; biological life is a product of evolution. From cellular chemistry to human brain cognition, everything is shaped by an incredibly long process of evolutionary selection.
Dobzhansky’s statement should be complemented with: ‘Nothing in human psychology makes sense except in the light of decision-making.’ Life is about making decisions: going right or left, fleeing or fighting, eating or avoiding something. An organism's success or failure at surviving and reproducing depends on its decisions." (https://www.optimallyirrational.com/i/145656727/happiness-as-a-guide-to-action)
Following that perspective, I argue that ideological beliefs and ideological discussions are shaped by decisions: coalitional decisions. Starting from cognitive biases would lead to another question: what type of decision problems have led to the evolution of such biases? It is possible that these biases might have emerged for other decisions, or because evolution has not led to efficient design, but since ideological discussions are about social decisions, an explanation that starts from how we negotiate social decisions seems to me more natural.
It has long been abundantly obvious that "left" and "right" in the modern western sense of these words, are not coherent ideologies but ad hoc coalitions of different interest groups.
It is not that he misunderstood game theory, but rather the he used the maximin principle to model the choices made in the original position. This is not standard. As Harsanyi pointed out, it you use standard Bayesian decision theory, the argument for the original position leads to a utilitarian social welfare function, which is precisely what Rawls wanted to avoid. However, Ken Binmore, a game theorist, has tried to provide a coherent justification of Rawls argument by using axiomatic bargaining theory, which eventually leads to maximin.
Great post, Lionel, and thanks for referencing my work. I largely agree with you here. In the Alliance Theory paper, we write that, "allies must support one another in conflicts—for instance, by defending their allies’ reputations, attacking their rivals’ reputations, and mobilizing support from third parties." Naturally, reputational attacks and defenses will be more effective if they are (or appear to be) factually correct. Likewise, third parties will be more effectively mobilized by (the appearance of) truth and consistency than by blatant deception and hypocrisy. We write in our response to commentaries that partisans often "try as hard as they can to rationalize [their inconsistent beliefs]--that is, to make them seem perfectly reasonable and not at all odd. They might even succeed." We also write that "Political discourse is a competition to satisfy people’s moral intuitions, to rally them to our side, and to draw them away from the other side. We must all recognize and feel these moral intuitions; otherwise, we could not use them to rally supporters."
So the propagandistic biases we discuss are constrained by (the appearance of) reality and morality. The constraints are pretty loose, as reality and morality can be mimicked by sophistry and moralism--mimicry that political zealots will be eager to accept and promulgate. Third parties might even have some motivation to accept the mimicry--they might possess a certain level of ideological gullibility--insofar as this gullibility helps them join up with powerful alliances. Even those within the coalition may benefit from the propagandistic narrative if it enhances commitment and support for the group. The cost of any deception may be outweighed by increased success in collective action and intergroup competition.
You pose the question: "If it were common knowledge that [ideologies] are just fig leaves on naked interests, why would people pay attention to them?" The answer is, of course, that they wouldn't. This implies that if ideologies *were* just fig leaves on naked interests, partisans would have a *very strong political incentive* to hide that fact and prevent it from becoming common knowledge. They would construct elaborate excuses and rationalizations designed to make their naked interests seem high-minded, beneficent, and truthful. They would shun and condemn anyone who rejected such excuses and rationalizations, because they would be a threat to their coalition. If they failed in preventing the ugly truth from becoming common knowledge, their coalition would lose power. A lot of political discourse is about calling out the other side's ugly truths and covering up our own side's ugly truths.
So if ideologies *were* just fig leaves on naked interests, they would almost certainly lack the *appearance* of being fig leaves on naked interests. While I think ideologies serve several functions beyond covering up ugly truths about naked interests, I think covering up such ugly truths *is* one of their functions, along with bolstering commitment to the group, signaling group loyalty, competing for ingroup status, and winning over third parties.
If there is any disagreement here (and I'm not sure there is), it may relate to moral asymmetries between political coalitions. It seems like you're suggesting that each side has different moral principles they're fighting to implement? If so, I disagree. I think partisans share the same basic moral psychology: our shared moral intuitions are the "high ground" that we compete to capture. As we write in the paper: "Rather than disagreeing about justice in the abstract, partisans may merely disagree about who deserves status (and how much), who deserves condemnation (and how much), and who deserves sympathy (and how much). Indeed, much of political discourse plays out against a backdrop of tacit moral agreement. Disputants compete to frame their opponents as immoral—e.g., unfair, selfish, disrespectful—while relying on shared assumptions of what counts as moral."
Plus, I don't think partisans know much, or care much, about how practically effective their policies are in upholding their apparent moral principles. What they mainly care about is their group gaining power, status, and resources in competition with rival groups, and themselves gaining power, status, and resources in competition with their fellow group members. It's a cynical view, I know, but I think it's essentially correct. For instance, there is some polling data indicating that most partisans would refuse to switch parties even if scientific evidence proved that their party's policies failed to promote the common good: https://thepulseofthenation.com/#the-common-good
Of course, this cynical view is something that both sides will have an incentive to cover up and deny, in favor of their more uplifting and group-mobilizing narrative. And they will busily search for theories of ideology that vindicate the moral superiority of their side--or at least, theories that try to soften the reputational damage that the truth might inflict. That some theories of ideology are more emotionally threatening than others is, in my view, one of the many empirical facts that any good theory of ideology should be able to explain. I think Alliance Theory (along with my work on social paradoxes) can explain it. https://osf.io/preprints/psyarxiv/avh9t_v1
Thanks a lot for your extended answer, David! There’s no disagreement along the line you suggested. I agree with you that the primitive we should start with is the difference in interests, not differences in principles. Those interests lead coalitions to advocate for different principles, principles that justify outcomes favourable to them. Your paper rightly pushes for a clear-eyed, realist view of ideology, moving away from the idealised accounts we're often taught to believe.
The arbitrariness and instrumental nature of ideological bundles raises a real question: why do people take these debates seriously if it’s all just strategic? My view is that ideological debate plays a genuine role in negotiating the social contract, that is, in shaping general rules to allocate rights, duties, and entitlements in society. These rules need to appear justified and broadly acceptable, and consistency matters because it enables the rules to be applied in practice. Just like in any negotiation, actors may use deception, selective framing, or emotional appeals to gain advantage, but this doesn’t mean they are merely mimicking political engagement. Strategic behaviour doesn’t preclude genuine disagreement or serious deliberation; it simply means that the outcome is shaped by the balance of power and interests, not by disinterested reasoning alone.
On your point about shared moral psychology, I agree that most political actors appeal to broadly shared moral intuitions, fairness, loyalty, harm, etc. But competing coalitions support different principles for allocating status, sympathy, and condemnation, because they have different preferences over the distribution of these goods. In other words, the choice of who deserves what is determined by general principles regulating social interaction, and those principles reflect coalitional interests. So while the underlying moral building blocks may be shared, the principles constructed from them are contested, and ideologies help package those principles in politically useful ways.
This perspective is inspired by Ken Binmore’s Game Theory and the Social Contract, which I’ll discuss in later posts.
Great points. A bit too cynical for my taste (and for what current research necessitates) :))
By the way, I am really intrigued to know more about those 12-14% who would change their parties if evidence convinced them.
I guess you’re a glass 12-14% full kind of person. :)
I am more of a whatever can quench my thirst even a little bit person:))
Good stuff
I would point out that to label your own view cynical is a somewhat amusing undermining of the real strength and value of your own argument
It's not cynical to accept your position. It is IMHO realistic. If this entails revealing a dark side to human behavior, which it does, then so be it. Recognizing the fact of a dark side is not cynical. If it is well evidenced (which IMHO it is) then to accept this fact it's not cynical. It is realistic.
As for Lionel, whose work I much enjoy, we have exchanged a few comments and he too has a residual faith in a view which you might characterize as less cynical.
For myself, I believe both of you have done terrific work in advancing material in the reality of group behavior. I embrace the dark side that has come to view. But because I am happy about it. But rather because that's the reality.
🙏
I agree with much of this analysis, but I think that it neglects deeper causes of ideologies. I believe that ideologies are not so much justifications of ad hoc political coalitions (as you argue) as rationalizations of non-rational psychological perceptions of the world.
Voters choose between ideologies based on their underlying psychological temperament (i.e. they use the non-rational part of their brain).
That temperament is largely determined by genetics, but parenting, culture, and life experiences also play a role. This explains why 30-60% of the variance in ideological views can explained by by genes.
For those who are interested, I go into more detail here:
https://frompovertytoprogress.substack.com/p/where-does-ideology-come-from
Enjoyed that. Subscribed
Hi Michael,
The Substack is called "Optimally Irrational", following the book of the same name, so my starting point is that there are good reasons behind our behaviour that the "irrationality" literature from behavioural economics often overlooks. Our cognition is the result of an evolutionary process, and evolution sanctions good/bad decisions (https://www.optimallyirrational.com/p/why-we-should-look-for-the-good-reasons).).
As a matter of methodological principle, I find it problematic to start from cognitive features as fundamental explanations. I wrote in a previous post:
"In 1973, biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky wrote: ‘Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.’ This statement is obviously true; biological life is a product of evolution. From cellular chemistry to human brain cognition, everything is shaped by an incredibly long process of evolutionary selection.
Dobzhansky’s statement should be complemented with: ‘Nothing in human psychology makes sense except in the light of decision-making.’ Life is about making decisions: going right or left, fleeing or fighting, eating or avoiding something. An organism's success or failure at surviving and reproducing depends on its decisions." (https://www.optimallyirrational.com/i/145656727/happiness-as-a-guide-to-action)
Following that perspective, I argue that ideological beliefs and ideological discussions are shaped by decisions: coalitional decisions. Starting from cognitive biases would lead to another question: what type of decision problems have led to the evolution of such biases? It is possible that these biases might have emerged for other decisions, or because evolution has not led to efficient design, but since ideological discussions are about social decisions, an explanation that starts from how we negotiate social decisions seems to me more natural.
It has long been abundantly obvious that "left" and "right" in the modern western sense of these words, are not coherent ideologies but ad hoc coalitions of different interest groups.
What do you mean by not standard in this context?
And frankly Rawls' philosophy is itself rather incoherent, his problem being that he doesn't understand the game theory he attempted to use.
I don't recall - did he explicitly refer to game theory or was he presenting ideas that could be interpreted in that light?
His position relies on arguing that since in his 'pre-existent' state predates risk tolerance, we must treat it as maximally risk averse.
After a little research it seems that he referred to game theory but didn't really use it in any technical sense.
How would you say he misunderstood game theory and how did this failure undermine his work?
It is not that he misunderstood game theory, but rather the he used the maximin principle to model the choices made in the original position. This is not standard. As Harsanyi pointed out, it you use standard Bayesian decision theory, the argument for the original position leads to a utilitarian social welfare function, which is precisely what Rawls wanted to avoid. However, Ken Binmore, a game theorist, has tried to provide a coherent justification of Rawls argument by using axiomatic bargaining theory, which eventually leads to maximin.
100%
Good piece
One of the things that is sure to get everyone riled up is the truism “all arguments from ideology are wrong”.