Reading the interview, I'm struck by the weakness of the evidence for behavior in humans, such as kin-specific altruism and sex differences in behavior, that are easily observable in most animal species of which I am aware, where there is obvious kin preference and plenty of sexual dimorphism.
here are very few instances of interesting human universals here: rather we have statistical evidence of differences in means
To offer a couple of counterpoints,
1. Humans have an amazing willingness to extend altruism way beyond the point where it can serve any evolutionary purpose, to entire nations, social classes, religious groupings and, ideally, humanity as a whole. Nationalism is much easier to observe than, for example, preference for full siblings over half-siblings
2. Differences in behavior between men and women seem to be mostly statistical and dependent on a common environment. This is also true of physical characteristics like height and weight.
I am not sure I fully get your two points. But for sure I agree that "Humans have an amazing willingness to extend altruism way beyond the point where it can serve any evolutionary purpose, to entire nations, social classes, religious groupings and, ideally, humanity as a whole." I discussed in the chapter on social identity in "Optimally Irrational" how our sense of identity and the willingness to make sacrifices for our group are likely evolved traits that arose as a result of gene-culture co-evolution with cohesive groups being more successful. In modern times, these feelings are triggered in situations that differ from our ancestral environment (e.g. national feelings in large nation states).
In the chapter on kindness, I also make the point that following rules of kindness is likely a psychological trait selected as a solution to the commitment problem. People who are and behave like deontological (conditional) cooperators are more likely to be trusted and selected as social partners. One way to think of this is that "(true) honesty is the best policy" in the long run.
This interview with an esteemed evolutionary psychologist seemed like a fine occasion to harshly critique his discipline. The outrageous and unironic hubris of his book's title ("The Ape that Understood the Universe") is so revealing that I'm almost tempted to end the critique here 😬 But that won't do.
With respect, though I greatly appreciate that the interview genuinely asked some hard questions and made a point of including some criticisms of the field, the actual delivery of those comes across here as very sympathetic and pro forma (too "softball"), a mutual admiration society just going through the motions for the audience. An evolutionary perspective is not necessary and frequently counterproductive in regards to asking "what is the function of this" questions without ending up with "just so story" answers, especially in regards to psychology, due to frequently historically inaccurate presuppositions about prior conditions and cultures. I don't see any added value provided by an evolutionary perspective that is not adequately provided by other approaches more firmly grounded in the observable here and now.
Hi Steven, thanks for engaging. I am explicitly favourable to an evolutionary perspective so that is the background of my questions, for sure.
In regard to your criticisms:
“An evolutionary perspective is not necessary and frequently counterproductive in regards to asking "what is the function of this" questions without ending up with "just so story" answers”
“especially in regards to psychology, due to frequently historically inaccurate presuppositions about prior conditions and cultures.”
- Any scientific discipline has a past filled with inaccurate presuppositions. Scientific disciplines keep move forward. Many critiques of evolutionary theory applied to behavioural sciences have a dated view of how it is done. For example here is my work, I do not believe your criticism applies to it: https://www.gskubitz.com/uploads/6/2/6/3/62634961/25_06_24_draft.pdf
“I don't see any added value provided by an evolutionary perspective that is not adequately provided by other approaches more firmly grounded in the observable here and now”
- I wrote in my previous post why I think this criticism is misguided:
Reading the interview, I'm struck by the weakness of the evidence for behavior in humans, such as kin-specific altruism and sex differences in behavior, that are easily observable in most animal species of which I am aware, where there is obvious kin preference and plenty of sexual dimorphism.
here are very few instances of interesting human universals here: rather we have statistical evidence of differences in means
To offer a couple of counterpoints,
1. Humans have an amazing willingness to extend altruism way beyond the point where it can serve any evolutionary purpose, to entire nations, social classes, religious groupings and, ideally, humanity as a whole. Nationalism is much easier to observe than, for example, preference for full siblings over half-siblings
2. Differences in behavior between men and women seem to be mostly statistical and dependent on a common environment. This is also true of physical characteristics like height and weight.
Hi John,
I am not sure I fully get your two points. But for sure I agree that "Humans have an amazing willingness to extend altruism way beyond the point where it can serve any evolutionary purpose, to entire nations, social classes, religious groupings and, ideally, humanity as a whole." I discussed in the chapter on social identity in "Optimally Irrational" how our sense of identity and the willingness to make sacrifices for our group are likely evolved traits that arose as a result of gene-culture co-evolution with cohesive groups being more successful. In modern times, these feelings are triggered in situations that differ from our ancestral environment (e.g. national feelings in large nation states).
In the chapter on kindness, I also make the point that following rules of kindness is likely a psychological trait selected as a solution to the commitment problem. People who are and behave like deontological (conditional) cooperators are more likely to be trusted and selected as social partners. One way to think of this is that "(true) honesty is the best policy" in the long run.
This interview with an esteemed evolutionary psychologist seemed like a fine occasion to harshly critique his discipline. The outrageous and unironic hubris of his book's title ("The Ape that Understood the Universe") is so revealing that I'm almost tempted to end the critique here 😬 But that won't do.
https://substack.com/@cozyshark/note/c-82288436?r=1y1e12
I'd welcome some lively discussion with anyone interested -- but especially those who happen to disagree.
With respect, though I greatly appreciate that the interview genuinely asked some hard questions and made a point of including some criticisms of the field, the actual delivery of those comes across here as very sympathetic and pro forma (too "softball"), a mutual admiration society just going through the motions for the audience. An evolutionary perspective is not necessary and frequently counterproductive in regards to asking "what is the function of this" questions without ending up with "just so story" answers, especially in regards to psychology, due to frequently historically inaccurate presuppositions about prior conditions and cultures. I don't see any added value provided by an evolutionary perspective that is not adequately provided by other approaches more firmly grounded in the observable here and now.
Hi Steven, thanks for engaging. I am explicitly favourable to an evolutionary perspective so that is the background of my questions, for sure.
In regard to your criticisms:
“An evolutionary perspective is not necessary and frequently counterproductive in regards to asking "what is the function of this" questions without ending up with "just so story" answers”
- It is a common criticism, I think it is misguided as a general criticism. See my answer here: https://www.optimallyirrational.com/i/151904087/just-so-stories
“especially in regards to psychology, due to frequently historically inaccurate presuppositions about prior conditions and cultures.”
- Any scientific discipline has a past filled with inaccurate presuppositions. Scientific disciplines keep move forward. Many critiques of evolutionary theory applied to behavioural sciences have a dated view of how it is done. For example here is my work, I do not believe your criticism applies to it: https://www.gskubitz.com/uploads/6/2/6/3/62634961/25_06_24_draft.pdf
“I don't see any added value provided by an evolutionary perspective that is not adequately provided by other approaches more firmly grounded in the observable here and now”
- I wrote in my previous post why I think this criticism is misguided:
https://www.optimallyirrational.com/i/151904087/why-is-it-needed
This should be in the mix: https://www.danielnettle.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/198.pdf
Very good reference indeed