Good catch. The reason is that the fame of tit for tat is arguably somewhat overblown. It is not a SPNE and it does not win as universally as is typically reported. Other strategies beat it. I did not choose not to include it but I did not feel it had to be included for the point I was making.
How important is SPNE as a solution concept? I get why it’s formally appealing, but I also think it’s kind of odd to say that the only rational play in the ultimatum game is (offer minimum, accept anything).
Thank you very much for this. I wonder if you have any thoughts on the antisocial punishment - how it fits in the cooperation framework and whether it’s a thing at all - can it be one of the artifacts of one-off games?
I think there is one, not necessarily the only one, explanation.
As I mentioned in the post, there is a multiplicity of ways to cooperate. A way to cooperate in a group takes the form of social norms. These norms specify rights and duties. They are the rules of the social games in the group. People are meant to be as "nice" as specified by these norms, but they are not expected to be nicer than that. For instance, I have a duty to help somebody in distress in the street, but there are limits to what is expected from me. I do not have a duty to house that person for several years in my home.
People can be more prosocial than what is requested from them. They can go above and beyond the standard expected from them. Doing so brings praise and reputation. However, it only works if it is seen as genuine, i.e. done for the sake of being nice, not to gain reputation. People who are overly nice face the risk of being perceived as try-hards pretending to be nice to raise their social profile. From that perspective, anti-social punishment is punishing those who are perceived as trying to gain social goodwill by artificially exaggerating how nice they really are. The accusations of do-gooders, virtue signallers, and so on are a reflection of this suspicion.
Thanks a lot, very interesting piece. Your explanation of how repeated interactions and the “shadow of the future” make cooperation rational is spot on. I’ve written on my blog about sustainable behaviour, and I keep coming back to the same idea: public reputation is one of the strongest tools we have to overcome both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Tragedy of the Commons.
When cooperative behaviour is visible and remembered, incentives shift. People and even more organisations act sustainably not just out of altruism, but because reputation makes cooperation the smart strategy. Your article captures that logic beautifully.
This is great stuff, as usual. But I think you are somewhat too hard on the experimental literature on social preferences in one shot games since the question of to what extent we truly care about others and about fairness/unfairness (even if this caring is just an accidental byproduct of our evolved tendency to maximize or at least manage our own reputations for being good guys) is both important and far from obvious... In fact even those who are the strongest believers in social preferences and the value of the one shot game experimental literature might not argue at all about the evolutionary roots of these preferences. (Curious if you disagree or I'm misunderstanding, thanks!)
surprised that a ctl-f for "Tit-for-Tat" came up empty
Good catch. The reason is that the fame of tit for tat is arguably somewhat overblown. It is not a SPNE and it does not win as universally as is typically reported. Other strategies beat it. I did not choose not to include it but I did not feel it had to be included for the point I was making.
How important is SPNE as a solution concept? I get why it’s formally appealing, but I also think it’s kind of odd to say that the only rational play in the ultimatum game is (offer minimum, accept anything).
Thank you very much for this. I wonder if you have any thoughts on the antisocial punishment - how it fits in the cooperation framework and whether it’s a thing at all - can it be one of the artifacts of one-off games?
I think there is one, not necessarily the only one, explanation.
As I mentioned in the post, there is a multiplicity of ways to cooperate. A way to cooperate in a group takes the form of social norms. These norms specify rights and duties. They are the rules of the social games in the group. People are meant to be as "nice" as specified by these norms, but they are not expected to be nicer than that. For instance, I have a duty to help somebody in distress in the street, but there are limits to what is expected from me. I do not have a duty to house that person for several years in my home.
People can be more prosocial than what is requested from them. They can go above and beyond the standard expected from them. Doing so brings praise and reputation. However, it only works if it is seen as genuine, i.e. done for the sake of being nice, not to gain reputation. People who are overly nice face the risk of being perceived as try-hards pretending to be nice to raise their social profile. From that perspective, anti-social punishment is punishing those who are perceived as trying to gain social goodwill by artificially exaggerating how nice they really are. The accusations of do-gooders, virtue signallers, and so on are a reflection of this suspicion.
Very interesting thank you
Thanks a lot, very interesting piece. Your explanation of how repeated interactions and the “shadow of the future” make cooperation rational is spot on. I’ve written on my blog about sustainable behaviour, and I keep coming back to the same idea: public reputation is one of the strongest tools we have to overcome both the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Tragedy of the Commons.
When cooperative behaviour is visible and remembered, incentives shift. People and even more organisations act sustainably not just out of altruism, but because reputation makes cooperation the smart strategy. Your article captures that logic beautifully.
Thanks Maria, glad you liked it!
Have you read Vernon Smith? It sounds like you probably have, but if not you need to check out his his work on ecological rationality!
No I do not know him! I will certainly look up his writings.
I have wirtten a blog about environmental psychology in Dutch: https://www.coach-psycholoog-denhaag.nl/psychologie-duurzaamheid/
where I also mention the importance of reputation and social norms.
This is great stuff, as usual. But I think you are somewhat too hard on the experimental literature on social preferences in one shot games since the question of to what extent we truly care about others and about fairness/unfairness (even if this caring is just an accidental byproduct of our evolved tendency to maximize or at least manage our own reputations for being good guys) is both important and far from obvious... In fact even those who are the strongest believers in social preferences and the value of the one shot game experimental literature might not argue at all about the evolutionary roots of these preferences. (Curious if you disagree or I'm misunderstanding, thanks!)
I am thrillled to see this article, game theory as developed in behavioral economics is immensely valuable for social philosophy!