This is a nice summary. The view of norms as the temporary equilibria of a *many* agent dynamic system is clearly right. But there are many factors in the system, and whether nefarious powerful groups can create new norms or not I tend to agree they can't create new ones out of whole cloth - they can and have shaded them or prolonged the acceptance of poor equilibria in ways that are bad for the majority. So I'd argue that something like the vibe of the mental model trap you call out is pointing to something real.
I agree that the question of how norms change is important. I’ll look at it in a series of posts on Binmore’s theory about it (from his book “Natural justice“).
I really enjoyed this summary on social norms! Francesco Guala's "Understanding Institutions" fits the literature cited here well. From his book I especially like the notion "correlation device". Staying with the traffic example: a traffic light is a correlation device because it sends a reliable signal to the players of the game about which strategy to pursue. The content of the correlation device doesn't really matter as long as the signal is clear to all players of the game. We don't stop at red and go at green because something about these colours inherently makes us behave this way. We could have cats for stop and dogs for go, or any other pairs, and traffic would still be regulated. I'd say that red and green are mutually salient cues, or focal points, grounded in cultural conventions (plus the colour red has a particular psychological effect). I find society level focal points fascinating: what emerge as focal points in the first place, how they stabilise at the society level, etc.
A side note: I'm not sure what exactly Tomasello means by "shared intentionality". By and large, people are subject to the same costs of not playing the social game right (reputation costs, internal feelings of shame and guilt). Then, one may assume that, in general, people have the same intentions, which is to avoid these costs by not violating norms. Shared intentionality is not the same as having a common understanding of norms. Having a common understanding of norms can regulate social interactions: if I know what the prevailing norms are in a given social context, I know how to behave. I also know that others know what the norms are, therefore I expect them to behave in a certain way, and I know that they too expect me to behave in a certain way.
This is a nice summary. The view of norms as the temporary equilibria of a *many* agent dynamic system is clearly right. But there are many factors in the system, and whether nefarious powerful groups can create new norms or not I tend to agree they can't create new ones out of whole cloth - they can and have shaded them or prolonged the acceptance of poor equilibria in ways that are bad for the majority. So I'd argue that something like the vibe of the mental model trap you call out is pointing to something real.
I agree that the question of how norms change is important. I’ll look at it in a series of posts on Binmore’s theory about it (from his book “Natural justice“).
I really enjoyed this summary on social norms! Francesco Guala's "Understanding Institutions" fits the literature cited here well. From his book I especially like the notion "correlation device". Staying with the traffic example: a traffic light is a correlation device because it sends a reliable signal to the players of the game about which strategy to pursue. The content of the correlation device doesn't really matter as long as the signal is clear to all players of the game. We don't stop at red and go at green because something about these colours inherently makes us behave this way. We could have cats for stop and dogs for go, or any other pairs, and traffic would still be regulated. I'd say that red and green are mutually salient cues, or focal points, grounded in cultural conventions (plus the colour red has a particular psychological effect). I find society level focal points fascinating: what emerge as focal points in the first place, how they stabilise at the society level, etc.
A side note: I'm not sure what exactly Tomasello means by "shared intentionality". By and large, people are subject to the same costs of not playing the social game right (reputation costs, internal feelings of shame and guilt). Then, one may assume that, in general, people have the same intentions, which is to avoid these costs by not violating norms. Shared intentionality is not the same as having a common understanding of norms. Having a common understanding of norms can regulate social interactions: if I know what the prevailing norms are in a given social context, I know how to behave. I also know that others know what the norms are, therefore I expect them to behave in a certain way, and I know that they too expect me to behave in a certain way.
Thanks for your comment! Your point in Guala’s book is right. Correlation device is a very interesting topic. It may be worth a future post.
Regarding “shared intentionality”, there is an aspect of shared beliefs and higher order beliefs: I know that you know… that I want. See for instance his discussion of what is required for “pointing a finger” to work: https://x.com/page_eco/status/1464200802017300488?s=46&t=TL-UqZBfb4ixuexu8yrUzg