Throughout this series my understanding of morality evolved much like my understanding of natural selection evolved over the years (only a bit quicker).
The way you set out the argument has a remarkable inevitability and simplicity to it, it g has been a kind of massive Aha!-Erlebnis, in which you keep thinking for a while, “surely it cannot be that simple?” until eventually all the pieces drop into place.
The parallel is strong to me: life in all its incredible complexity and intricacy, all of it, emerged from one simple process, natural selection, and morality evolved in much the same way, with selection pressures for certain choices over others, and with multiple solutions to the same problems.
Just like there is no “right” number of legs, method of propulsion, mechanism for spreading seed etc, so there is nothing unconditionally “right” about whether/how we ought to cooperate, raise offspring, honour the dead, keep secrets, exploit others for our own benefit etc.
would expect though that there is much convergent evolution and there are stable attractors for core morality that enables social functioning. In that limited sense those morals could be seen as objective but that will not satisfy those who yearn for something with 'higher principles'. Also while the signifiers of loyalty, trustworthiness etc could be as varied as the plumage of birds, that there will be some such signifiers would seem to be highly likely. Interestingly our ability to reason about morality, in the way Lionel has, enables us to change the selection pressures. For example by extending our moral circle to animals who have no bargaining power at all. Whether those morals become an established part of social convention depends partly on the negotiating power of their proponents, for example in they become loyalty signifiers of elite groups, but also on the oratorical skills of their proponents to leverage our psychological impulses to feel more empathy for animals.
"In that limited sense, those morals could indeed be seen as objective, but that will not satisfy those who yearn for something with “higher principles.”"
That is a very reasonable take, which I share to some extent. I resist the impulse to lean on this interpretation because I think our preference for some absolute aspect of reality might lead us to give more metaphysical weight to it than it deserves.
I think any set of morals can be (and is!) seen as objective. AFAICS, few vegans are sufficiently moral relativist to acknowledge that it is possible to be moral and eat meat. People simply elevate their morals to *be* the higher principles.
Just like in biology, there are multiple ‘stable’ outcomes possible, one not ‘better’ than the other, but all good enough (for the time being).
The negotiation power angle seems to be on the money, and at first sight does not have an equivalent in biological evolution.
I feel that way about all your series. Before each post in a series, have an introduction, "This is part of a series on _____," with links following giving each title in the best reading order.
I can't count how many times I've recommended "The truth about happiness: we are designed to long for it, not to get it", and I always wish someone who goes there could easily go to the other posts in the series. I wish it were better known. In utopia, you would write a book about it, it illuminates so much. For example, I thought Rebecca Newberger Goldstein's "The Mattering Instinct" would have been better if she had contended with it. I couldn't help thinking of your contention that moral philosophy "seems to have remained strikingly oblivious to the developments in evolutionary theory and game theory, leading to endless meandering through self-created conceptual mazes".
Alas, it is not always true that, "In physics, bad theories can quickly hit the wall of observation." In theoretical physics, String Theory was the big thing for three decades, even though it had absolutely no observational support (it had no observational falsification either, because it made no predictions that could be tested). But it fit a preferred narrative: with our high powered-mathematics, we can develop a theory of everything and unify all the forces in physics.
Here’s yPage is right to strip the incense off morality.
Most moral rules are not magic tablets from the clouds. They are evolved social machinery. Ways to manage trust, cheating, loyalty, punishment, status, and who gets what after people cooperate.
“Fairness” is often just bargaining power with nicer table manners.
When the powerful win, their advantage slowly gets laundered into morality. When the weak gain numbers, votes, money, or leverage, suddenly the “moral consensus” changes. Funny how that works.
That doesn’t mean morality is fake or useless. Quite the opposite. It means it is deadly serious.
A society needs shared rules or it turns into endless haggling, resentment, betrayal, and punishment. But we should stop pretending every fashionable moral claim is eternal truth.
A lot of it is just coalition politics wearing a priest’s robe.
So the real question is not “Who sounds the most moral?”
It is: who benefits when this rule gets treated as sacred?
As a historian this all makes perfect sense. Which is not my normal response to substack philosophy.
Main comment is that I did not notice (acknowledging that I read the opening and read more quickly onwards) a section about how morality changes over time due to the interaction of the once accepted actions with reality and with individual responses to those once accepted. In short morality is in constant development, but the more evident over longer periods.
I also do not think ‘murder’ is a good term. The question is which killings are acceptable, even good, and which not. A duel today would be manslaughter at best, potentially murder; killing someone for insult once acceptable, now it is not. That is what is a bad killing is exactly the same question as what is moral - a societal outcome to assist good order.
"how morality changes over time due to the interaction of the once accepted actions with reality and with individual responses to those once accepted."
I have not discussed this indeed in this series. There is clearly learning in the way you describe within society and there is selection across groups with groups having better norms able to that sustain higher levels of cooperation. I plan to talk about cultural evolution in a next series.
As many people have pointed out, the Commandment does not say, "Thou shalt not kill." It says "Thou shalt not murder." Murder is unjustified killing, and the same God who gave the Commandments also commanded His people to kill the inhabitants of the Promised Land and take it over.
I never heard of Sugden until now; thanks for the name-drop. Binmore and Hume are the most frequently mentioned here, and now Sugden is a new economist to study his work on game-theoretic moral cooperation.
Robert Sugden came a bit earlier than Binmore and influenced him. He builds on the Humean view of morality as conventions and sees them as equilibria of games. The key addition from Binmore to this literature is that the selection between equilibria reflects an underlying bargaining problem. You can find Sugden's views in his 1986 and 2018 books.
I found much to like and agree with in your views on morality. Thanks for writing about them.
However, from my perspective, the morality you describe is arguably as innate to our universe as the simple mathematics underlying the game theory of cooperation problems.
Note that this innate-to-our-universe origin may make little to no difference to your other main conclusions.
How can we know that morality (as the underlying selection force for cultural moral norms and the biology underlying our moral sense) is innate to our universe?
Consider the scientific question: Why do our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist?
I argue that, although not yet explicitly stated, the science of morality literature, particularly over the last 30 years or so, is consistent with the following answers.
The primary reason our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist is that they solve cooperation problems. Specifically,
1) Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems.
2) Universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without creating them with other groups.
The scientific truth of these two claims largely rests on their being the best explanation of past and present cultural moral norms and on the intuitive judgments of our moral sense as parts of known cooperation strategies from game theory. Most are parts of reciprocity strategies in which ethnic markers can increase the likelihood of successful cooperation by signaling more reliable cooperators.
For example, versions of the Golden Rule advocate initiating indirect reciprocity, perhaps the most powerful known cooperation strategy. And ethnic marker norms, such as “do not eat pigs” and “respect the sacred,” mark people who uphold them as less likely to exploit your attempts at cooperation.
I see advantages of this science-based perspective. It can better help people resolve disputes about which moral norms to enforce (including weighing the importance of all of Haidt’s moral foundations). It can also help reveal the powerful instrumental reasons people should prefer acting morally. Finally, the science-based perspective clarifies the function of punishment for immoral behavior and when that punishment itself becomes immoral.
You reference Binmore and other game theorists. What is your reaction to the idea that morality as cooperation strategies is as innate to our universe as game theory's simple mathematics?
Thank you for this series of texts. I think your analysis is spot on in most parts. However, there is one problem, as I see it. It does not account for the fact that moral progress is possible, and has, in fact, occurred.
The relativism in your account cannot allow one to conclude that a society has progressed morally during some specific period, as far as I can tell. I think this is a major flaw of your theory. You simply refer to the dynamics of societal change as explaining changing notions of fairness, leaving no causal role for moral argument.
I have some ideas on how this challenge can be met without jettisoning the bulk of your account. I hope to be able to write about this in a future text.
Saying "moral progress is possible" assumes there is some absolute morality, and societies can approach it. That is certainly most people's intuition, but it is not possible in a consistent materialism. I see Page as trying to be consistent. No doubt, this result is icky. And difficult to accept. But, as he says, so is relativity and quantum.
Let me take an example: since 2009, homosexual couples can get married in exactly the same legal manner as heterosexual couples in Sweden. Did this elimination of discrimination constitute moral progress? I would say: without a doubt. It is a fact.
The relativist must deny this. I think that is a problem for the relativist.
In one of his texts Lionel quotes Ricky Gervais: "I am anti-racist, of course I am. But I am willing to admit that if I had been born 300 years ago and I was white and wealthy, I’d have probably have owned slaves. ... My point is morality evolves." Does that "of course I am" come *solely* from the fact that it is the common view in our society today? There is no other reason for it? That seems unlikely to me.
Also: note that comment about evolution. I believe there is an analogy between Darwin's "survival of the fittest" and moral progress. Some societies and moralities are found to be more conducive to the good life for the persons involved.
Now, does moral progress require absolute morality, or non-materialism? I am not so sure. All that is required is that two states of affairs can be compared. I believe such a comparison can be made naturalistically in terms of measures of the cooperation required to obtain improved satisfaction of the life goals of the parties involved. Absolute morality is not necessary, improvement is sufficient. This is the argument I hope to develop in a future text.
Yes, Lionel does strive for consistency. But the relativist position has well-known problems of its own. For example. Exactly how does one delineate a society with an internally consistent morality? Was Sweden before 2009 simply a different moral society than Sweden after 2009, end of story? That is a strange way of describing it. Or did Sweden undergo moral progress? Seems more straightforward.
If it is possible to provide a naturalistic account of morality that allows for the fact of moral progress, then that theory of morality will be preferable to a relativist naturalistic account, in my opinion. If nothing else, it will make better sense of moral agency and moral argument, since it will provide a richer account than just the power-balance type explanation, which undoubtedly is important, but not the whole picture.
" If it is possible to provide a naturalistic account of morality that allows for the fact of moral progress"
A consistent materialist would say that is like saying "if it is possible to provide a naturalistic account of eating that allows for the fact of progress in culinary taste." Or a naturalistic account of dwelling places that allows for the fact of progress in housing styles. Or music styles. Or art styles. Or ...
It assumes that there is such a thing as "moral progress". As good members of WEIRD 2026 societies, we believe that, of course, we have made moral progress from 1950 or 1850 or 150. But someone who believes that everyone is put on earth to fill a spot in a hierarchy would believe the opposite. They would reject the idea that "improved satisfaction of the life goals of the parties involved" is a valid measure of morality. Or if they were philosophers, they might say that what matters is satisfaction of the parties' true life goals, the ones that are given naturally by the universe--which are to fit into the natural hierarchy. We, of course, would think of them as moral troglodytes, moral cretins. Because we know we are better. We are citizens of the present.
Seriously, did lots of citizens of Nazi Germany think they had made moral progress from 1926? They were now purifying the human race, instead of letting it be destroyed from within. Of course, we laugh at that idea. But lots of them really believed it. Fortunately, they were blinkered and wrong and we are right. What a great time and place to live.
I'll take the opportunity to clarify my position. My take is clearly deflationary and reticent to talk of "moral progress" because this seems to imply an external gauge of progress relative to which we can measure where our historical path is currently located. I think we might have this intuition, and moral absolutism can be appealing, but the position developed in the series is that moral absolutism does not make sense, and that even the most famous philosophical schools supporting this view have faulty foundations, even if hidden behind technical discussions.
Now it is possible to have a less ambitious take. Some social contracts are better able to sustain social cooperation successfully in a way that makes society more prosperous. From the point of view of the members of that society, this can be more desirable. In that sense, there is a form of “progress”. In particular, ex post, institutions that benefit a large proportion of the population are seen as progress by societies that have become democratic. Note that this is not an objective criterion; it is rather just that more people like it and are happy with this evolution today.
Moral arguments can still have a causal role in this process: they can expose inconsistencies in an existing social contract, make some claims more salient, and help coordinate people around new norms, without needing to reveal an external moral truth. Having said that, the key point of this series is to argue in favour of abandoning moral absolutist positions because, while they might appeal to our intuitions, they are misguided and prevent us from apprehending how morality really works.
"Now it is possible to have a less ambitious take. Some social contracts are better able to sustain social cooperation successfully in a way that makes society more prosperous. From the point of view of the members of that society, this can be more desirable. In that sense, there is a form of “progress”."
Indeed. But like all similar arguments, it already begins with a moral assumption, that what is more desirable to members of a society is more moral. As someone said of mathematical modelling, "the conclusions are already in the assumptions."
Hi Roger, I think we are actually in full agreement. I did not say that the “progress” was “moral progress”. What I had in mind was rather a kind of "Pareto dominance": everyone is better off with social contract A, so there is a consensus in favour of that social contract.
I often give the example of the driving equilibrium. Most people would prefer the Singapore equilibrium, where most people carefully respect the rules, to the Cairo one, where traffic rules are often disregarded. In fact, even Cairo residents would likely prefer to experience the Singapore equilibrium. It is in this minimal sense that we can say that some social contracts are better than others in a kind of objective sense: people’s outcomes are better under social contract A, and there would be a consensus to move to that social contract if it were feasible.
With respect, Nietzsche didn’t define nihilism as “believing in nothing.” That’s the modern gloss. For Nietzsche, nihilism is genealogical: it’s the collapse produced when moral absolutes lose their authority. Nihilism is the outcome of morality, not its absence. He came close to my position, but he still treated morality as corrupted by the mediocre — rather than seeing morality itself as the underlying problem.
With respect, have you studied the history of morality?
Because before we can engage with a topic like this, we need foundations — a clear definition and a precise genealogy. Otherwise we end up smuggling assumptions into the discussion. So I have to ask: which morality are you referring to?
Ok, thanks for the reply, but I think you misunderstood my point. The post, and in fact all I have seen on the topic, presuppose morality without defining it, fail to clarify what morality they are discussing, nor show evidence that it is a legitimate category to consider. My position is not a moral claim, for I reject the category entirely.
Concerning the statement, "[I]f we want to be well-accepted players of the game of life, we ought to abide by the rules of the social contract."
I agree that morality is concerned with hypothetical and not categorical imperatives, but this is the wrong hypothetical imperative.
Given your proposition above, there are many cases in which the premise can be true and the conclusion is false. It would be more accurate to say, "If we want to be well-accepted players of the game of life, we ought to abide by the rules of the social contract when doing so will make it the case that we are well-accepted players of the game of life (or when failure to do so will harm our being well-accepted players in the game of life).
There are many instances in which a person's status as a well-accepted player of the game of life will be unaffected by a failure to abide by the rules of the social contract, such as when one can violate the contract without being caught.
Also, we must consider the fact that there are no standard rules of the social contract. Instead, there are a wide variety of rules. Following the rules accepted by one community often requires violating the rules established by another community. In fact, it would be hard to find an act that would not make one a well-accepted member of some community or other.
This then implies that if the community we wish to be accepted in is that of the slave plantation owners, then we ought to abide by the rules of that society and defend and promote slavery. If we want to be well-accepted members of the Nazi Party we ought to do that which the members of the Nazi Party would expect of us. We can talk about people wanting to be well-accepted members of the mob, well-accepted members of MAGA, well-accepted members of Ghengis Khan's army, etc.
In addition, unless there is a second source of "ought" out there not being mentioned, this would have to be a bi-conditional: "We ought to abide by the rules of the social contract if and only if (and only insofar as) we want to be well-accepted players in the game of life." Which means that morality is not bounding on those who do not care about being well-accepted members of society.
It seems to imply, "If you value something more than we value being well-accepted players in the game of life (among this or that community), such as ridding the population of Jews or abusing children or being the wealthiest person on the planet, then you ought (morally) to prioritize that goal over being a well-accepted player in the game of life."
You write that, "moral rules are shared and accepted conventions in a social community, helping organise and smooth social interactions."
So, I have to ask.
What if there is a shared and accepted convention called "moral" that does not help organize and smooth social interactions? What status does that norm get?
What if there are conventions that are not shared or accepted but, if they were shared and accepted, would help organize and smooth social interactions?
Depending on how you answer these questions you are likely to end up with either"
Moral rules are shared and accepted conventions OR moral rules are conventions that, if shared and accepted, would help organize and smooth social intereactions.
But you would not end up with the definition originally presented.
(NOTE: I would go with the latter. Morality concerns those rule that, if they were shared and accepted, would help organize and smooth social interactions. Well, even here, there is a significant problem with "rules" in that it raises the question, "Why follow the rule when I can benefit from breaking it?" So, in the place of "rules", I would put "values" or, more accurately "desires and aversions cultivated using praise and condemnation".)
I am a firm believer in the normative approach of morality with its core principle of "an action is immoral if it causes unjustified harm to others." The other things you discuss, social norms, taboos, etc. are not really "moral" questions in my view. Not that I did not enjoy your essay, just that it strayed off what I consider "morality."
My biggest problem with moral philosophy is the lack of discussion of human variability with regard to morality. There seems to be an expectation of "universal moral rules." Reality indicates otherwise. Certainly there is a lot of moral commonality among most people but human moral codes are far from universal. This stems from variable views of terms like "unjustified", "harm", and who (or what) counts as "others." Aborting an unborn human fetus can be considered "wrong", therefore laws banning abortion should be enacted. But legislating away a women's right to chose how to deal with her pregnancy is also causing harm. Which is more morally correct? Depends on subjective opinion. Same goes with gun rights, animal rights, and a whole host of other issues.
Laws and social norms are partly in response to normative morality, but partly in response to other social conditions. I have no idea how "keep the Sabbath holy" is a moral issue, but it shows up anyway.
"Aborting an unborn human fetus can be considered "wrong", therefore laws banning abortion should be enacted. But legislating away a women's right to chose how to deal with her pregnancy is also causing harm. Which is more morally correct? Depends on subjective opinion. Same goes with gun rights, animal rights, and a whole host of other issues."
First of all, I had to look up Ronald Coase. Never heard of him before. Second, what is your point? Coase makes the point that avoiding harm entirely is impossible. It is up to society to decide. Do you agree with this point of view? Do you think that there is such a thing as objective morality. Or do you agree that morality is subjective?
I'm sorry I used a reference that was obscure to you. I spent much of my life around economists and public policy people and he is well-known to them. He won the economics Nobel in 1991.
One of his best known ideas is that most costs are reciprocal and you usually can't say "X should be illegal because it results in a cost." A law that denies a women's right to choose imposes a cost on her, but a law that allows abortion imposes a cost on the fetus. If you are a utilitarian, you have to decide which is the greater cost. If you have strict gun control, you impose a cost on people who want to own guns and give up some crime deterrence and crime prevention. If you allow anyone to own anything, you impose a cost on the people who will be hurt by people using those guns in hurtful ways. If people have no right to kill animals, you have imposed a cost on anyone who wants to eat meat or go hunting or fishing. If you allow killing, you have imposed a cost (the ultimate cost, death) on various animals.
I do not think there is a Platonic essence called morality. People certainly have feelings of right and wrong. That comes from some combination of inborn predisposition and their life experience. Similarly, people have a sense of "what tastes good", "which is the best band" "what is the best art", etc. They are all subjective feelings, often justified by argument and often firmly held..
Perhaps the appeal of moral absolutism is selected for because high plateaus in the moral landscape grow higher still when more people converge on them. A population that's constantly in search of deeper moral principles to converge on is more likely to achieve a larger and more diverse culture that can still cooperate, with adaptive advantages for that entire population.
Really enjoyed this. The commitment-problem section is the best explanation I've seen for why moral realist intuitions persist even among people who'd reject realism on paper.
But it proves more than you're crediting. A belief only functions as a credible commitment device if the person actually holds it past the point of provisional convenience. Treat every conviction as permanently open to revision and the trust-generating mechanism collapses. Trust comes from a belief tested against real cost and kept anyway, not one you'd happily trade out tomorrow for a better argument.
So if the posture itself is visibly "just" adaptive, doesn't it stop working the moment everyone sees through it? Or once enough cynical philosophers help the public see through it? The theory explains why conviction is useful. It doesn't excuse you from planting a flag and holding it when holding costs something real.
"So if the posture itself is visibly "just" adaptive, doesn't it stop working the moment everyone sees through it?"
That would certainly be true if people were perfectly logical. But they are not. Opposing that (at times) is the desire to fit in, to be thought well of by other people in our society, so basic that it is largely unconscious. That seems to be something we can't help, any more than a 16-year old male can stop being horny by repeating Chesterfield's debunking of sex: "The pleasure is momentary, the position is ridiculous, and the expense is damnable."
A well argued evolutionary view of morality. I think some parts of could benefit from applying the same logic to the framework.
I think the "no ought" criticism is partly justified - this framework presents itself as an alternative to a religious "skyhooks" reading. Through this quality, the outcome is changed by measuring it. History is littered with examples of people who have used evolutionary frameworks as a basis for changing the moral structure of society, and not always for the better. Some people do start messing with the tennis rules.
While one might argue this is not a correct or justifiable response to adopting an evolutionary framework for morality, we still can observe this behavioural outcome, thus that weakness is truly present.
In a similar vein, you conclude that a religious underpinning for morality should rightly fade over time. There is an assumption here that this framework is not just superior epistemically but also superior for wider society in a practical sense too. While I am sympathetic to your view, I must admit the evidence for that is hardly ironclad. In this way, the political qualities of this framework are revealed.
Throughout this series my understanding of morality evolved much like my understanding of natural selection evolved over the years (only a bit quicker).
The way you set out the argument has a remarkable inevitability and simplicity to it, it g has been a kind of massive Aha!-Erlebnis, in which you keep thinking for a while, “surely it cannot be that simple?” until eventually all the pieces drop into place.
The parallel is strong to me: life in all its incredible complexity and intricacy, all of it, emerged from one simple process, natural selection, and morality evolved in much the same way, with selection pressures for certain choices over others, and with multiple solutions to the same problems.
Just like there is no “right” number of legs, method of propulsion, mechanism for spreading seed etc, so there is nothing unconditionally “right” about whether/how we ought to cooperate, raise offspring, honour the dead, keep secrets, exploit others for our own benefit etc.
Fantastic stuff, Lionel. Bravo!👏
Very glad you find it that useful Koen!
would expect though that there is much convergent evolution and there are stable attractors for core morality that enables social functioning. In that limited sense those morals could be seen as objective but that will not satisfy those who yearn for something with 'higher principles'. Also while the signifiers of loyalty, trustworthiness etc could be as varied as the plumage of birds, that there will be some such signifiers would seem to be highly likely. Interestingly our ability to reason about morality, in the way Lionel has, enables us to change the selection pressures. For example by extending our moral circle to animals who have no bargaining power at all. Whether those morals become an established part of social convention depends partly on the negotiating power of their proponents, for example in they become loyalty signifiers of elite groups, but also on the oratorical skills of their proponents to leverage our psychological impulses to feel more empathy for animals.
"In that limited sense, those morals could indeed be seen as objective, but that will not satisfy those who yearn for something with “higher principles.”"
That is a very reasonable take, which I share to some extent. I resist the impulse to lean on this interpretation because I think our preference for some absolute aspect of reality might lead us to give more metaphysical weight to it than it deserves.
I think any set of morals can be (and is!) seen as objective. AFAICS, few vegans are sufficiently moral relativist to acknowledge that it is possible to be moral and eat meat. People simply elevate their morals to *be* the higher principles.
Just like in biology, there are multiple ‘stable’ outcomes possible, one not ‘better’ than the other, but all good enough (for the time being).
The negotiation power angle seems to be on the money, and at first sight does not have an equivalent in biological evolution.
Great series, unless I missed it you should create a table of contents for the previous posts
I feel that way about all your series. Before each post in a series, have an introduction, "This is part of a series on _____," with links following giving each title in the best reading order.
I can't count how many times I've recommended "The truth about happiness: we are designed to long for it, not to get it", and I always wish someone who goes there could easily go to the other posts in the series. I wish it were better known. In utopia, you would write a book about it, it illuminates so much. For example, I thought Rebecca Newberger Goldstein's "The Mattering Instinct" would have been better if she had contended with it. I couldn't help thinking of your contention that moral philosophy "seems to have remained strikingly oblivious to the developments in evolutionary theory and game theory, leading to endless meandering through self-created conceptual mazes".
Alas, it is not always true that, "In physics, bad theories can quickly hit the wall of observation." In theoretical physics, String Theory was the big thing for three decades, even though it had absolutely no observational support (it had no observational falsification either, because it made no predictions that could be tested). But it fit a preferred narrative: with our high powered-mathematics, we can develop a theory of everything and unify all the forces in physics.
Here’s yPage is right to strip the incense off morality.
Most moral rules are not magic tablets from the clouds. They are evolved social machinery. Ways to manage trust, cheating, loyalty, punishment, status, and who gets what after people cooperate.
“Fairness” is often just bargaining power with nicer table manners.
When the powerful win, their advantage slowly gets laundered into morality. When the weak gain numbers, votes, money, or leverage, suddenly the “moral consensus” changes. Funny how that works.
That doesn’t mean morality is fake or useless. Quite the opposite. It means it is deadly serious.
A society needs shared rules or it turns into endless haggling, resentment, betrayal, and punishment. But we should stop pretending every fashionable moral claim is eternal truth.
A lot of it is just coalition politics wearing a priest’s robe.
So the real question is not “Who sounds the most moral?”
It is: who benefits when this rule gets treated as sacred?
As a historian this all makes perfect sense. Which is not my normal response to substack philosophy.
Main comment is that I did not notice (acknowledging that I read the opening and read more quickly onwards) a section about how morality changes over time due to the interaction of the once accepted actions with reality and with individual responses to those once accepted. In short morality is in constant development, but the more evident over longer periods.
I also do not think ‘murder’ is a good term. The question is which killings are acceptable, even good, and which not. A duel today would be manslaughter at best, potentially murder; killing someone for insult once acceptable, now it is not. That is what is a bad killing is exactly the same question as what is moral - a societal outcome to assist good order.
"how morality changes over time due to the interaction of the once accepted actions with reality and with individual responses to those once accepted."
I have not discussed this indeed in this series. There is clearly learning in the way you describe within society and there is selection across groups with groups having better norms able to that sustain higher levels of cooperation. I plan to talk about cultural evolution in a next series.
As many people have pointed out, the Commandment does not say, "Thou shalt not kill." It says "Thou shalt not murder." Murder is unjustified killing, and the same God who gave the Commandments also commanded His people to kill the inhabitants of the Promised Land and take it over.
I never heard of Sugden until now; thanks for the name-drop. Binmore and Hume are the most frequently mentioned here, and now Sugden is a new economist to study his work on game-theoretic moral cooperation.
Robert Sugden came a bit earlier than Binmore and influenced him. He builds on the Humean view of morality as conventions and sees them as equilibria of games. The key addition from Binmore to this literature is that the selection between equilibria reflects an underlying bargaining problem. You can find Sugden's views in his 1986 and 2018 books.
Lionel,
I found much to like and agree with in your views on morality. Thanks for writing about them.
However, from my perspective, the morality you describe is arguably as innate to our universe as the simple mathematics underlying the game theory of cooperation problems.
Note that this innate-to-our-universe origin may make little to no difference to your other main conclusions.
How can we know that morality (as the underlying selection force for cultural moral norms and the biology underlying our moral sense) is innate to our universe?
Consider the scientific question: Why do our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist?
I argue that, although not yet explicitly stated, the science of morality literature, particularly over the last 30 years or so, is consistent with the following answers.
The primary reason our moral sense and cultural moral norms exist is that they solve cooperation problems. Specifically,
1) Descriptively moral behaviors solve cooperation problems.
2) Universally moral behaviors solve cooperation problems without creating them with other groups.
The scientific truth of these two claims largely rests on their being the best explanation of past and present cultural moral norms and on the intuitive judgments of our moral sense as parts of known cooperation strategies from game theory. Most are parts of reciprocity strategies in which ethnic markers can increase the likelihood of successful cooperation by signaling more reliable cooperators.
For example, versions of the Golden Rule advocate initiating indirect reciprocity, perhaps the most powerful known cooperation strategy. And ethnic marker norms, such as “do not eat pigs” and “respect the sacred,” mark people who uphold them as less likely to exploit your attempts at cooperation.
I see advantages of this science-based perspective. It can better help people resolve disputes about which moral norms to enforce (including weighing the importance of all of Haidt’s moral foundations). It can also help reveal the powerful instrumental reasons people should prefer acting morally. Finally, the science-based perspective clarifies the function of punishment for immoral behavior and when that punishment itself becomes immoral.
You reference Binmore and other game theorists. What is your reaction to the idea that morality as cooperation strategies is as innate to our universe as game theory's simple mathematics?
Thank you for this series of texts. I think your analysis is spot on in most parts. However, there is one problem, as I see it. It does not account for the fact that moral progress is possible, and has, in fact, occurred.
The relativism in your account cannot allow one to conclude that a society has progressed morally during some specific period, as far as I can tell. I think this is a major flaw of your theory. You simply refer to the dynamics of societal change as explaining changing notions of fairness, leaving no causal role for moral argument.
I have some ideas on how this challenge can be met without jettisoning the bulk of your account. I hope to be able to write about this in a future text.
Saying "moral progress is possible" assumes there is some absolute morality, and societies can approach it. That is certainly most people's intuition, but it is not possible in a consistent materialism. I see Page as trying to be consistent. No doubt, this result is icky. And difficult to accept. But, as he says, so is relativity and quantum.
Let me take an example: since 2009, homosexual couples can get married in exactly the same legal manner as heterosexual couples in Sweden. Did this elimination of discrimination constitute moral progress? I would say: without a doubt. It is a fact.
The relativist must deny this. I think that is a problem for the relativist.
In one of his texts Lionel quotes Ricky Gervais: "I am anti-racist, of course I am. But I am willing to admit that if I had been born 300 years ago and I was white and wealthy, I’d have probably have owned slaves. ... My point is morality evolves." Does that "of course I am" come *solely* from the fact that it is the common view in our society today? There is no other reason for it? That seems unlikely to me.
Also: note that comment about evolution. I believe there is an analogy between Darwin's "survival of the fittest" and moral progress. Some societies and moralities are found to be more conducive to the good life for the persons involved.
Now, does moral progress require absolute morality, or non-materialism? I am not so sure. All that is required is that two states of affairs can be compared. I believe such a comparison can be made naturalistically in terms of measures of the cooperation required to obtain improved satisfaction of the life goals of the parties involved. Absolute morality is not necessary, improvement is sufficient. This is the argument I hope to develop in a future text.
Yes, Lionel does strive for consistency. But the relativist position has well-known problems of its own. For example. Exactly how does one delineate a society with an internally consistent morality? Was Sweden before 2009 simply a different moral society than Sweden after 2009, end of story? That is a strange way of describing it. Or did Sweden undergo moral progress? Seems more straightforward.
If it is possible to provide a naturalistic account of morality that allows for the fact of moral progress, then that theory of morality will be preferable to a relativist naturalistic account, in my opinion. If nothing else, it will make better sense of moral agency and moral argument, since it will provide a richer account than just the power-balance type explanation, which undoubtedly is important, but not the whole picture.
" If it is possible to provide a naturalistic account of morality that allows for the fact of moral progress"
A consistent materialist would say that is like saying "if it is possible to provide a naturalistic account of eating that allows for the fact of progress in culinary taste." Or a naturalistic account of dwelling places that allows for the fact of progress in housing styles. Or music styles. Or art styles. Or ...
It assumes that there is such a thing as "moral progress". As good members of WEIRD 2026 societies, we believe that, of course, we have made moral progress from 1950 or 1850 or 150. But someone who believes that everyone is put on earth to fill a spot in a hierarchy would believe the opposite. They would reject the idea that "improved satisfaction of the life goals of the parties involved" is a valid measure of morality. Or if they were philosophers, they might say that what matters is satisfaction of the parties' true life goals, the ones that are given naturally by the universe--which are to fit into the natural hierarchy. We, of course, would think of them as moral troglodytes, moral cretins. Because we know we are better. We are citizens of the present.
Seriously, did lots of citizens of Nazi Germany think they had made moral progress from 1926? They were now purifying the human race, instead of letting it be destroyed from within. Of course, we laugh at that idea. But lots of them really believed it. Fortunately, they were blinkered and wrong and we are right. What a great time and place to live.
Hi both!
I'll take the opportunity to clarify my position. My take is clearly deflationary and reticent to talk of "moral progress" because this seems to imply an external gauge of progress relative to which we can measure where our historical path is currently located. I think we might have this intuition, and moral absolutism can be appealing, but the position developed in the series is that moral absolutism does not make sense, and that even the most famous philosophical schools supporting this view have faulty foundations, even if hidden behind technical discussions.
Now it is possible to have a less ambitious take. Some social contracts are better able to sustain social cooperation successfully in a way that makes society more prosperous. From the point of view of the members of that society, this can be more desirable. In that sense, there is a form of “progress”. In particular, ex post, institutions that benefit a large proportion of the population are seen as progress by societies that have become democratic. Note that this is not an objective criterion; it is rather just that more people like it and are happy with this evolution today.
Moral arguments can still have a causal role in this process: they can expose inconsistencies in an existing social contract, make some claims more salient, and help coordinate people around new norms, without needing to reveal an external moral truth. Having said that, the key point of this series is to argue in favour of abandoning moral absolutist positions because, while they might appeal to our intuitions, they are misguided and prevent us from apprehending how morality really works.
"Now it is possible to have a less ambitious take. Some social contracts are better able to sustain social cooperation successfully in a way that makes society more prosperous. From the point of view of the members of that society, this can be more desirable. In that sense, there is a form of “progress”."
Indeed. But like all similar arguments, it already begins with a moral assumption, that what is more desirable to members of a society is more moral. As someone said of mathematical modelling, "the conclusions are already in the assumptions."
Hi Roger, I think we are actually in full agreement. I did not say that the “progress” was “moral progress”. What I had in mind was rather a kind of "Pareto dominance": everyone is better off with social contract A, so there is a consensus in favour of that social contract.
I often give the example of the driving equilibrium. Most people would prefer the Singapore equilibrium, where most people carefully respect the rules, to the Cairo one, where traffic rules are often disregarded. In fact, even Cairo residents would likely prefer to experience the Singapore equilibrium. It is in this minimal sense that we can say that some social contracts are better than others in a kind of objective sense: people’s outcomes are better under social contract A, and there would be a consensus to move to that social contract if it were feasible.
With respect, Nietzsche didn’t define nihilism as “believing in nothing.” That’s the modern gloss. For Nietzsche, nihilism is genealogical: it’s the collapse produced when moral absolutes lose their authority. Nihilism is the outcome of morality, not its absence. He came close to my position, but he still treated morality as corrupted by the mediocre — rather than seeing morality itself as the underlying problem.
With respect, have you studied the history of morality?
Because before we can engage with a topic like this, we need foundations — a clear definition and a precise genealogy. Otherwise we end up smuggling assumptions into the discussion. So I have to ask: which morality are you referring to?
Hi Graham, this post places this perspective in the landscape of moral theories. https://www.optimallyirrational.com/p/morality-works-without-absolute-moral
Ok, thanks for the reply, but I think you misunderstood my point. The post, and in fact all I have seen on the topic, presuppose morality without defining it, fail to clarify what morality they are discussing, nor show evidence that it is a legitimate category to consider. My position is not a moral claim, for I reject the category entirely.
Concerning the statement, "[I]f we want to be well-accepted players of the game of life, we ought to abide by the rules of the social contract."
I agree that morality is concerned with hypothetical and not categorical imperatives, but this is the wrong hypothetical imperative.
Given your proposition above, there are many cases in which the premise can be true and the conclusion is false. It would be more accurate to say, "If we want to be well-accepted players of the game of life, we ought to abide by the rules of the social contract when doing so will make it the case that we are well-accepted players of the game of life (or when failure to do so will harm our being well-accepted players in the game of life).
There are many instances in which a person's status as a well-accepted player of the game of life will be unaffected by a failure to abide by the rules of the social contract, such as when one can violate the contract without being caught.
Also, we must consider the fact that there are no standard rules of the social contract. Instead, there are a wide variety of rules. Following the rules accepted by one community often requires violating the rules established by another community. In fact, it would be hard to find an act that would not make one a well-accepted member of some community or other.
This then implies that if the community we wish to be accepted in is that of the slave plantation owners, then we ought to abide by the rules of that society and defend and promote slavery. If we want to be well-accepted members of the Nazi Party we ought to do that which the members of the Nazi Party would expect of us. We can talk about people wanting to be well-accepted members of the mob, well-accepted members of MAGA, well-accepted members of Ghengis Khan's army, etc.
In addition, unless there is a second source of "ought" out there not being mentioned, this would have to be a bi-conditional: "We ought to abide by the rules of the social contract if and only if (and only insofar as) we want to be well-accepted players in the game of life." Which means that morality is not bounding on those who do not care about being well-accepted members of society.
It seems to imply, "If you value something more than we value being well-accepted players in the game of life (among this or that community), such as ridding the population of Jews or abusing children or being the wealthiest person on the planet, then you ought (morally) to prioritize that goal over being a well-accepted player in the game of life."
You write that, "moral rules are shared and accepted conventions in a social community, helping organise and smooth social interactions."
So, I have to ask.
What if there is a shared and accepted convention called "moral" that does not help organize and smooth social interactions? What status does that norm get?
What if there are conventions that are not shared or accepted but, if they were shared and accepted, would help organize and smooth social interactions?
Depending on how you answer these questions you are likely to end up with either"
Moral rules are shared and accepted conventions OR moral rules are conventions that, if shared and accepted, would help organize and smooth social intereactions.
But you would not end up with the definition originally presented.
(NOTE: I would go with the latter. Morality concerns those rule that, if they were shared and accepted, would help organize and smooth social interactions. Well, even here, there is a significant problem with "rules" in that it raises the question, "Why follow the rule when I can benefit from breaking it?" So, in the place of "rules", I would put "values" or, more accurately "desires and aversions cultivated using praise and condemnation".)
And now go through Ayn Rand and knock out her objectivism, that is anti-Jesus and pure individualism.
I am a firm believer in the normative approach of morality with its core principle of "an action is immoral if it causes unjustified harm to others." The other things you discuss, social norms, taboos, etc. are not really "moral" questions in my view. Not that I did not enjoy your essay, just that it strayed off what I consider "morality."
My biggest problem with moral philosophy is the lack of discussion of human variability with regard to morality. There seems to be an expectation of "universal moral rules." Reality indicates otherwise. Certainly there is a lot of moral commonality among most people but human moral codes are far from universal. This stems from variable views of terms like "unjustified", "harm", and who (or what) counts as "others." Aborting an unborn human fetus can be considered "wrong", therefore laws banning abortion should be enacted. But legislating away a women's right to chose how to deal with her pregnancy is also causing harm. Which is more morally correct? Depends on subjective opinion. Same goes with gun rights, animal rights, and a whole host of other issues.
Laws and social norms are partly in response to normative morality, but partly in response to other social conditions. I have no idea how "keep the Sabbath holy" is a moral issue, but it shows up anyway.
"Aborting an unborn human fetus can be considered "wrong", therefore laws banning abortion should be enacted. But legislating away a women's right to chose how to deal with her pregnancy is also causing harm. Which is more morally correct? Depends on subjective opinion. Same goes with gun rights, animal rights, and a whole host of other issues."
Ronald Coase strikes again.
First of all, I had to look up Ronald Coase. Never heard of him before. Second, what is your point? Coase makes the point that avoiding harm entirely is impossible. It is up to society to decide. Do you agree with this point of view? Do you think that there is such a thing as objective morality. Or do you agree that morality is subjective?
I'm sorry I used a reference that was obscure to you. I spent much of my life around economists and public policy people and he is well-known to them. He won the economics Nobel in 1991.
One of his best known ideas is that most costs are reciprocal and you usually can't say "X should be illegal because it results in a cost." A law that denies a women's right to choose imposes a cost on her, but a law that allows abortion imposes a cost on the fetus. If you are a utilitarian, you have to decide which is the greater cost. If you have strict gun control, you impose a cost on people who want to own guns and give up some crime deterrence and crime prevention. If you allow anyone to own anything, you impose a cost on the people who will be hurt by people using those guns in hurtful ways. If people have no right to kill animals, you have imposed a cost on anyone who wants to eat meat or go hunting or fishing. If you allow killing, you have imposed a cost (the ultimate cost, death) on various animals.
I do not think there is a Platonic essence called morality. People certainly have feelings of right and wrong. That comes from some combination of inborn predisposition and their life experience. Similarly, people have a sense of "what tastes good", "which is the best band" "what is the best art", etc. They are all subjective feelings, often justified by argument and often firmly held..
Perhaps the appeal of moral absolutism is selected for because high plateaus in the moral landscape grow higher still when more people converge on them. A population that's constantly in search of deeper moral principles to converge on is more likely to achieve a larger and more diverse culture that can still cooperate, with adaptive advantages for that entire population.
Really enjoyed this. The commitment-problem section is the best explanation I've seen for why moral realist intuitions persist even among people who'd reject realism on paper.
But it proves more than you're crediting. A belief only functions as a credible commitment device if the person actually holds it past the point of provisional convenience. Treat every conviction as permanently open to revision and the trust-generating mechanism collapses. Trust comes from a belief tested against real cost and kept anyway, not one you'd happily trade out tomorrow for a better argument.
So if the posture itself is visibly "just" adaptive, doesn't it stop working the moment everyone sees through it? Or once enough cynical philosophers help the public see through it? The theory explains why conviction is useful. It doesn't excuse you from planting a flag and holding it when holding costs something real.
"So if the posture itself is visibly "just" adaptive, doesn't it stop working the moment everyone sees through it?"
That would certainly be true if people were perfectly logical. But they are not. Opposing that (at times) is the desire to fit in, to be thought well of by other people in our society, so basic that it is largely unconscious. That seems to be something we can't help, any more than a 16-year old male can stop being horny by repeating Chesterfield's debunking of sex: "The pleasure is momentary, the position is ridiculous, and the expense is damnable."
A well argued evolutionary view of morality. I think some parts of could benefit from applying the same logic to the framework.
I think the "no ought" criticism is partly justified - this framework presents itself as an alternative to a religious "skyhooks" reading. Through this quality, the outcome is changed by measuring it. History is littered with examples of people who have used evolutionary frameworks as a basis for changing the moral structure of society, and not always for the better. Some people do start messing with the tennis rules.
While one might argue this is not a correct or justifiable response to adopting an evolutionary framework for morality, we still can observe this behavioural outcome, thus that weakness is truly present.
In a similar vein, you conclude that a religious underpinning for morality should rightly fade over time. There is an assumption here that this framework is not just superior epistemically but also superior for wider society in a practical sense too. While I am sympathetic to your view, I must admit the evidence for that is hardly ironclad. In this way, the political qualities of this framework are revealed.